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1.0 PURPOSE 
The focus of the NASA "Space flight Risk Data Collection and Analysis" project was 
to acquire and evaluate space flight data with the express purpose of establishing a 
database containing measurements of specific risk assessment-re1 iabi I ity-avai labil ity- 
maintainability-supportability (RRAMS) parameters. The developed comprehensive 
RRAMS database will support the performance of future NASA and aerospace industry 
risk and reliability studies. Launch performance record archives and other launch 
reports maintained by the Range Safety Office (RSO) of the 45th Space Wing (formerly 
Eastern Space and Missile Command - ESMC) at Patrick Air Force Base served as the 
initial source for acquiring data to implement the development of the database. Other 
sources, such as, the Western Space and Missile Command (WSMC) or Wallops Space 
Flight Center might provide additional avenues for supplementing the database in the 
future. 
One of the primary goals has been to acquire unprocessed information relating to the 
reliability and availability of launch vehicles and the subsystems and components 
thereof from the 45th Space Wing. After evaluating and analyzing this information, 
it was encoded in terms of parameters pertinent to ascertaining reliability and 
availability statistics, and then assembled into an appropriate database structure. 
The development of the risk and reliability database is  recognized to be important not 
only to NASA but the aerospace community in general. It is  essential to have an 
established source for obtaining risk and reliability estimates as a prelude for 
conducting formalized reliability and risk assessment studies. In addition, a proven 
database source offers a mean for improving the risk and reliability analyses currently 
being performed on aerospace systems. The database system developed as part of the 
"NASA Space Flight Risk Data Collection and Analysis" project forms the building 
block and initial stepping stone for increasing the accuracy of NASA's risk and 
reliabi I ity measurements. 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
Dimensions International (DI) and its subcontractor, Science Applications International 
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Corporation (SAIC) began work on the "NASA Space Flight Risk Data Collection and 
Analysis" project in mid-May 1993. Initial work involved project planning and 
coordination between team member participants. Next, the project team visited the 
45th Space Wing at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida in early June 1993 to acquire data 
and meet with range safety personnel. The 45th Space Wing trip resulted in the 
compilation of a large set of unprocessed launch performance reports covering several 
different launches by various launch vehicles. The launch vehicles for which data was 
obtained included the following: Atladcentaur, Apollo/Saturn, Brilliant Pebbles, Delta, 
Gemini, JupitedJuno, Redstone, Polaris, Pershing, Prospector (Joust), Red Tigress, Space 
Shuttle, Starbird, TMD Countermeasure Mitigation, and Vanguard. After reproducing 
the unprocessed data packages, DVSAIC divided the data sets and returned them to 
their separate facilities for analysis and processing. After formally organizing the raw 
data, the project team undertook an extensive review process. Following this, several 
meetings and telephone conversations were held between DI, SAlC and NASA 
personnel to determine the appropriate and feasible failure parameters to be extracted 
from the data sets. This information resulted in the creation of a data encoding 
worksheet form (ref. Figure 2-1) used by the data analysts in extracting specific facts 
from the data sets. A second review of the raw launch vehicle data sets resulted in the 
initial development of an organized set of launch vehicle data notebooks. Next, 
DVSAIC developed and submitted a formalized "Data Analysis Plan."' This plan 
described the approach and procedure the project team was to use in analyzing and 
evaluating the encoded information contained on the data encoding worksheets. In 
particular, it addressed the types of risk and reliability parameter measurements to be 
studied in reviewing the data sets. Also, it distinguished the specific statistic and 
probability computations to be made by the project analysts. DI and SAlC then used 
the guidelines furnished in the "Data Analysis Plan" to conduct comprehensive 
assessments of the data encoding worksheets. Launch vehicle notebooks were 
compiled containing the analysis results, the completed data encoding worksheets and 
the unprocessed launch vehicle performance records obtained from the 45th Space 
Wing. Similarly, computer database files were created for storing and maintaining the 
information contained on the data encoding worksheets. A separate database file was 
generated to incorporate the risk and reliability measurements computed for each 
launch vehicle, its systems, subsystems and components. 
45th Space Wing Data Analysis Plan, DI-DAP-001 
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2.1 Proiect Summarv 
The NASA Space Flight Risk Data Collection and Analysis project brought together a 
collective team of experienced professionals knowledgeable in the field of risk and 
reliability engineering. Project team members included the Project Managers, 
Engineers and Data Analysts from Dimensions international, Incorporated (DI), the 
prime contractor and its subcontractor, Science Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC), as well as the NASA Headquarters Risk Program Manager. Figure 2-2, depicts 
the overall structure of the project team and identifies the primary contributing 
representatives from each organization. 
c \ 
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LAUNCH VEHICLE DATA ENCODING SHER CAGE: - 
MXKLE PROGRAM: GENERATION OF VEHICLE: DATA PAGE: 
LAUNCHED FROM: 0 PAD: 0 OTHER: 
DATE OF LAUNCH: TIME: OGMT OEST OEDT 
DURAl” OF FUGHT/EST: RANGE: 
CONFIGINATION OF VEHICLE: 
(nomina0 
RSO EVALUATION: 0 SUCCESS 0 FAILURE 0 PARTIAL 0 UNKNOWN 
W C  EVALUATION: 0 SUCCESS 0 FAILURE 0 PARTW 0 UNKNOWN 
~~ 
W E  OF ANOMALYfiAILURE. O T A L O ’ ~ ~ ~  OGMT OEST IJEDT 
ANOMALYIFAILURE OCCURRENCE LOCATION. 
STAGE: 0 lSTSTG O2ND STG 0 3RDSTG 0 RE-ENTRY 0 OTHER 0 UNKNOWN 
SYSTEM 0 PROPULSION 0 GUIDANCE 0 STRUCTURAL 0 SEPARATION 0 FUGHT CONlROL 
SUBSYSTEM: 
0 ELECTRICAL 0 OTHER: 
COMPONENT 
FAILURE MODE: 
FAILURE ANALYSIS: 
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS: 
COMMENTS: 
Figure 2-1. Data Encoding Worksheet 
2.2 Proiect Process 
The project team developed and used a formalized data collection and analysis process 
in taking the raw launch data, evaluating it, and generating a database containing 
certain risk and reliability estimates. This structured process is  shown in Figure 2-3. 
The process was initiated with the acquisition of unprocessed launch performance 
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records and an assortment of data packages obtained from the 45th Space Wing at 
Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. This information was reproduced at the 45th Space 
Wing location and carried back to DI and SAlC facilities for analysis. An initial 
screening step was done at the two facilities to filter out materials deemed non- 
contributory to the database development process. The remaining information 
packages underwent a thorough review and evaluation process to identify failure data. 
Next, project team data analysts used a prescribed data encoding format (ref. Figure 
2-1 ) to accurately and consistently extract specific information from the data packages. 
The encoded data was reduced further by compiling facts on vehicle failure types, 
conditions and totals. Probability and statistical calculations were made using the 
reduced data including component failure probabilities and uncertainty limits. 
Products resulting from the data collection and analysis process include computer 
database files, launch vehicle notebooks, reports, graphs and tables. The primary 
byproduct, computer database files, is discussed herein along with graphs and tables 
resulting from the databases. 
DATA PRODUCTS 
compoter &tabam 
nku 
1 
Figure 2-3. Data collection and analvsis Process 
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Launch Vehicle(s) 
3.0 DATA PRODUCTS 
I 
11 
Ill 
IV 
V 
As mentioned previously, two primary products, developed for delivery to NASA 
Headquarters, are resulting from conducting the formalized data collection and analysis 
process. They include launch vehicle notebooks and computer database files. The 
contents and makeup of each product is described in the succeeding sections. 
Delta 
Atlas 
Polaris 
Pershing I1 
JupitedJuno; Saturn h 
3.1 Launch Vehicle Notebooks 
Six notebooks were assimilated and delivered to the NASA Headquarters Program Risk 
Manager. Notebooks were organized by launch vehicle types. However, launch 
vehicles with a small number of launches were integrated together into a single 
notebook. Table 3-1 provides a summary of the notebook contents. Typically, the 
notebooks are arranged to include a vehicle description, graphs depicting the reliability 
measu remen ts; tab I es contain i ng proba b i I i ty and statistical measurements; com p I eted 
data encoding worksheets and copies of the original launch performance records 
acquired from the 45th Space Wing. 
Table 3-1. launch Vehicle Notebooks 
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Vanguard; Gemini; Space Shuttle; Red Tigress I; Red 
Tigress II; Starbird; TMD Countermeasure Mitigation; 
Brilliant Pebbles; Prospector (Joust) 
3.1.1 Notebook I 
Notebook I contains a compilation of information acquired and developed on the 
Delta launch vehicle. In particular, facts are included covering 179 Delta launches 
which occurred during the period of May 1960 to December 1992 from Cape 
Canaveral, Florida. Included in the notebook are graphs displaying the vehicle's 
success probabilities; tables summarizing the computed failure probabilities; completed 
data encoding worksheets; and copies of the acquired performance records. Also, a 
general description of the vehicle along with i ts  history, as described by AIAA2 is 
i n cl ud ed . 
3.1.2 Notebook II 
The composition of Notebook II includes information and facts on the launches of the 
Atlas vehicle. Launch performance records covering Atlas launches from Cape 
Canaveral, Florida during the period of June 1957 to March 1993 are included. 
Several different Atlas configurations, ranging from the original A vehicle to the I 
model, are covered. Also included are graphs depicting the vehicle's success 
probabilities; tables summarizing the computed failure probabilities; and completed 
data encoding worksheets. 
3.1.3 Notebook 111 
*Isakowitz, Steven J., "International Reference Guide to SPace Launch Svstems", AIM, 
1991 Edition 
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Notebook 111 includes an assimilation of the information on the Polaris missile. 
Information and facts covering 140 Polaris launches are addressed. The launch period 
is from April 1957 to April 1965. Also contained in the notebook is  a brief vehicle 
description; graphs displaying the vehicle’s success probabilities; completed data 
encoding worksheets; and copies of the acquired performance records. Several unique 
annotations and findings are noted throughout the notebook based on Polaris 
submarine launches. 
3.1.4 Notebook IV 
Pershing II launches during the period of July 1982 to March 1988 are covered in 
Notebook IV. In all, information on 43 launches is  included. Also included are 
graphs depicting the vehicle’s success rates; finished data encoding worksheets; and 
reproductions of the launch performance records acquired from the 45th Space Wing. 
3.1.5 Notebook V 
Notebook V incorporates data acquired on the Jupiter/Juno and Saturn launch vehicles. 
Information included covers 46 JupitedJuno launches and 20 Saturn launches. 
Jupiter/Juno launches occurred during the period of March 1957 to January 1963. 
Similarly, Saturn launches took placeduring the period of October 1961 to April 1970. 
Graphs showing the vehicles’ success probabilities; tables reiterating the computed 
failure probabilities; completed data encoding worksheets; and copies of the acquired 
performance records are contained in the notebook. 
3.1.6 Notebook VI 
Notebook VI contains information and facts on several launch vehicles with a small 
number of launches or limited launch and/or failure information. This include facts 
and information on Vanguard, Gemini, Space Shuttle, Red Tigress I & II, Starbird, TMD 
Countermeasure Mitigation, Brilliant Pebbles and Prospector (Joust). Unlike the other 
notebooks, summary tables and graphs are not provided for all the vehicles. Vehicles 
with recent launches such as, Red Tigress, Starbird, TMD Countermeasure Mitigation, 
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Brilliant Pebbles and Prospector have experienced one to four launches total and 
therefore in most cases do not provide enough failure data to make meaningful failure 
calcu lat ions. 
3.1.7 Data Encoding Worksheets 
Figure 2-1 shows a blank data encoding worksheet illustrating the format used in 
capturing specific information from the acquired launch performance records. The 
sheet is divided into two primary sections. The first section (or top portion of the 
form) provides an area for acquiring data on the launch itself. This includes space for 
identifying vehicle configuration, launch date, launch time, launch pad, range and so 
on. The second section (or lower portion) captures specific information on the launch 
failures, such as, time of anomaly/failure, failure mode, failure analysis and so on. The 
data encoding worksheets were completed by the DI and SAlC data analysts in 
reviewing and evaluating the launch performance records. Each worksheet 
corresponds to a specific launch performance record as noted by the Data Page box 
provided in the upper right-hand corner. 
During the evaluation of the launch performance records the DI and SAlC data analysts 
went through several evaluation iterations. The first iteration involved an assessment 
of the launch vehicle’s performance. Subsequent passes through the data was made 
with the aim of evaluaing the performance of the vehicle’s lower level elements 
(i.e.,stages, systems, subsystems, and components). Equipment performance was 
assessed in terms success or failure. The DIISAIC Evaluation block on the data 
encoding worksheets was annotated based on the analysts’ assessment. Each iteration 
through the analysis process was conducted independent of the preceeding iterations. 
In this way, the analysts evaluated the performance of the lower level equipment 
elements (i.e., stages, systems, subsystems, and components) on their own merit. 
Thus, an incipient system failure resulting from a degraded subsystem and catastrophic 
component failure is analyzed as such. 
Failure severities were classified into one ofsthree categories in evaluating the launch 
performance records. These categories include Catastrophic, Degraded, and Incipient. 
The definition of the failure categories, tailored from definitions given in the IEEE 
9 
NASA Headquarters, Code Q 
RISK AND RELIABILITY DATABASE 
EQUIPMENT 
LEVEL 
a 
DESCRIPTION 
a 
Vehicle 
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Mission not accomplished. Examples include destroying the vehicle and not placing 
the satellite in an useable orbit. 
Stage fails to perform its intended function. Failure severity relates directly to the 
vehicle level. 
System fails to perform its intended function. Failure severity is only related to the 
system and not its impact on the stage or vehicle. 
Subsystem fails to perform its intended function. Failure severity is only related to 
the subsystem and not its impact on the system, stage or vehicle. 
Component fails to perform its intended function. Failure severity is only related to 
the component and not its impact on the subsystem, system, stage or vehicle. 
Standard3 are summarized in Table 3-2. 
Vehicle 
stage 
Table 3-2. Failure Severitv Classifications 
The mission, as planned, was not accomplished but was ultimately successful. An 
example includes placing satellite in wrong orbit. 
Stage performance is lowered. An example would be when a stage fails to reach its 
proper altitude due to a guidance problem, however, it reaches an altitude high 
enoueh. so that the satellite could later be placed in a useable orbit. 
FAILURE 
SEVERITY 
Catastrophic 
Degraded 
System 
Subsystem 
~ 
System performance is lowered. An example is the propulsion system not delivering 
its design thrust. 
Subsystem performance is lowered. Failure severity is only related to the subsystem 
and not its impact on the system, stage or vehicle. 
IEEE Std 500-1984 Appendix A 
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FAILURE EQUIPMENT 11 SEVERITY 1 LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
Component Component performance is lowered. An example is an engine turbo pump failing to 
reach its desien flow rate. 
Incipient I Vehicle I Impact on the mission is insignificant. 
System 
Subsystem 
Component 
Impact on the stage is insignificant. An example includes a stage failing to reach its 
proper altitude due to the guidance system malfunctioning, however it does reach an 
altitude where the satellite can later be placed in its proper orbit. 
Impact on the system is insignificant. An example is when the propulsion system 
causes uneven thrust. 
Impact on the subsystem is insignificant An example is an engine experiencing 
POGO. 
~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ 
Impact on the component is insignificant. An example is a turbo pump exhibiting 
minor vibrations. 
3.1.8 Data Analysis Summary Reports 
Failure probabilities are summarized in a tabular format and referenced in the 
notebooks as a "Data Analysis Summary Report" (ref. Figure 3-1). The information 
presented in the tables represent a compilation of the analysts' assessment of the 
failure information contained in the data encoding worksheets. Failure probabilities, 
based on the number of launch attempts described in the launch performance records, 
include data at the vehicle, stage, system, subsystem and component levels. Typically 
the tables include the number of failures, mean and median failure probabilities, upper 
and lower confidence boundaries, and estimating error factors. 
3.1.8.1 Failure Probabilitv Confidence Measure 
Data contained in the launch performance records does not lend itself for computing 
time-related reliability estimates. Very few of the launch performance records contain 
11 
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information that identifies the specific time when a failure occurs. Some of the time- 
related failure facts that are provided do not indicate when some of the lower level 
elements (i.e., system, subsystem and components) failed. Much of this results from 
the early vehicles not having adequate instrumentation to pinpoint when failures 
occurred. Therefore, time-independent failure probabilities were calculated, and 
included in the Data Analysis Summary Report tables. The failure probabilities are 
estimated based on the number of launch attempts. Mean failure probabilities are 
calculated by dividing the number of failures by the total number of launch records. 
For example, the Polaris missile have 51 vehicle-level catastrophic failures identified 
in the data set of 140 launch records. Therefore, the launch vehicle’s mean 
catastrophic failure probability is {51/,40} or 3.64E-01. 
A classical data confidence measure based on the F and Chi-square distributions is 
used to determine the confidence boundary for the failure probabilities. The F (ref. 
equation 1) and Chi-square (ref. equation 2 )  expressions are furnished below. When 
the difference between the number of launches and failures i s  small (i.e., less than 
100) then the Fdistribution is applied. Similarly, when the difference is  large (i.e., 
greater than 100) then the chi-square expression is used. 
12 
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[f+ 11[f,,,(2 f+2,2L -2 f l  
[L-11 +[f+l][f,,,(2f+2,2L-2fl 
< Pl < 
[d[f,.05(2t2L-2f+2)l 
[L - rJ + 1 +[d[f,,,( 2 15 2L -2 f+2)] 
where, f is the number of failures 
and, L is the number of launches 
3.1.9 Typical Graphs 
Two primary graphs are included in the notebooks for each launch vehicle. They 
include graphs of the Ratio of Success to Launches by launch sequence and by launch 
date. Depending on the performance of each individual vehicle, most graphs provided 
in the notebooks show an increasing or rising success rate as you move from left to 
right on both graphs. This partly results from the fact that the increasing number of 
launches, as you go from left to right, diminish the effect of the failures. Also, it 
results from a general reliability improvement that occurs over time (i.e., reliability 
growth). Two examples of the graphs contained in the data notebooks are shown in 
Figures 3-2 and 3-3. Figure 3-2 depicts the plot of success ratio to launch sequence 
for the Atlas launch vehicle. Two plots are provided. The top graph shows the 
success ratio when it is computed based on catastrophic failures only and the second 
(or lower) graph illustrates the case when the success ratio is  calculated using all 
failures (i.e., catastrophic, degraded and incipient). Similarly, Figure 3-3 displays the 
two Atlas success ratio graphs when they are plotted against the date of launch. 
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ATLAS RATIO OF SUCCESSES TO LAUNCHES 
BY LAUNCH 
(FOR 45TH SPACE WING DATA ONLY) 
0.8 
0 I I I I I I I I I I 
+! be b! e* ,a* ,+a ,%9 %e! 
Launch Sequence 
Figure 3-2. Atlas Ratio of Successes to launches bv launch 
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ATLAS RATIO OF SUCCESSES TO LAUNCHES 
BY DATE OF LAUNCH 
(FOR 45TH SPACE WING DATA ONLY) 
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Figure 3-3. Atlas Ratio of Successes to launches bv Date 
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3.2 Database Files 
Two types of database files have been developed as part of the launch vehicle 
database system. The first type incorporates information contained in the data 
encoding worksheets. The second type assimilates the reliability calculations and 
statistical uncertainties determined for the different launch vehicles and their 
subsystems and components. All computer files are structured using a dBase 111 Plus4 
compatible format based on guidance provided by the NASA Program Risk Manager. 
The database files developed herein represent a unique consortium of space flight data. 
Much of the historical information collected and assimilated on the different launch 
vehicles is  located in only one other source, that being the 45th Space Wing data files. 
The distinction of partial failures for the space flight components (i.e., degraded and 
incipient failure categories) cannot be found in any other sources. Thus, these 
database files are distinctive in several ways. In particular, this electronic storage 
medium permits easy searches for particular facts; allows information to be tracked; 
and makes the space flight data more accessible to more users. Also, the assimilation 
of this unique data set will ultimately foster improved risk and reliability studies. 
3.2.1 Data Encoding Database Files 
A total of eleven dBase Ill database files have been created to store the information 
contained on 11 of the launch vehicles’ completed data encoding worksheets. These 
11 files are organized into seven (7) individual 31/2 inch highdensity diskettes. Figure 
3-4 shows the distribution of data encoding database diskettes. Similar to the launch 
vehicle notebooks’ organization, described in Table 3-1, the data encoding database 
diskettes are arranged such that six diskettes coincide with the six launch vehicle 
notebooks. The seventh diskette contains a comprehensive database file that i s  a 
accumulation of all the records contained in the individual database files. Because of 
i ts large memory requirements, the comprehensive database file has been compressed 
and archived using Pkzip5 to accomodate storing it on a single diskette. To gain 
dBase I11 Plus is a licensed trademark of Ashton-Tate Company 4 
’Pkzip, copyright of Pkware, Incorporated 
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access to this file will require it to be extracted from its archive form. 
following steps to extract and store the file into a harddisk directory: 
Use the 
(1) 
(2) Type A: 
(3) 
Insert the "Comprehensive" database diskette in drive A. 
At the A > prompt, type pkunzip a:ldbaseiii\comp.zip c:l[dir]l[fi/enarne] 
Although the comprehensive database file contains the same information as that in the 
individual files, the individual launch vehicle databases are maintained to foster the 
development of these files. Since all vehicles have some unique characteristics, the 
separate database files apart from the comprehensive database, allows the user to 
restructure or tailor these databases based on the uniqueness of the vehicle. 
Table 3-3 presents an overview of the comprehensive data encoding database file. It 
also identifies the disk locations for the individual database files for various launch 
vehicles. In addition, it shows that data encoding information on 14 launch 
vehicldmissile types is included in the comprehensive database file. Also shown i s  
the launch period covered and the number of records in the database for each vehicle 
type. In all, the comprehensive database file contains 714 records corresponding to 
an equal number of completed data encoding worksheets housed in the notebooks. 
Provided in Appendix A is  a partial listing of the total comprehensive database file. 
The dBase I l l  database files are being translated into the more current dBase IV format 
and will be organized using the structure shown below. Twenty-eight of the database 
fields listed correspond directly to data available on the data encoding worksheets (ref. 
Figure 2-1). Fields 27 (Root Cause) and 28 (Cmmn failr) were added to the database 
after the encoding worksheet format was established. These two fields contain useful 
information such as failure root causes and common or related failure events. 
Fields 1,2, and 3 are character fields housing information on the vehicle identification. 
Two different page numbers are annotated on the data encoding worksheets. The page 
numbers are stored in Fields 4 and 5. Encoding page numbers (ENCD PAGE) 
correspond to the page numbers in the notebook. Data page numbers (DATAIPAGE) 
coincide with the launch performance record page numbers in the notebook. Fields 
6-15 contain information on the launch. This includes the launch pad (LNCH - FRM), 
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Figure 3-4. Data encoding database diskettes 
launch date (LNCH DATE), launch time (LNCH TIME) and its time standard 
(TIME STD), flight duration (FLT DUR) and its units of measure (DUR UNITS), 
nominal flight range (RANGE) andits units of measure (RANGE-UNIT), and the flight 
trajectory inclination (INCLNTN) and its units of measure (INCL UNIT). - 
A narrative on the vehicle configuration is  provided in Field 16 (VEH CNFC). Fields 
17 and 18 have a single character format for anotating the Range Safety Officer (RSO) 
and the project team analyst's assessment of the launch performance. One of four 
possible characters are typically supplied. They include "S" for success, "F" for failure, 
"P" for partial failure, and "U" for unknown. Based on the availability of information, 
data is primarily provided in Fields 19-29 for those cases when the launch was 
determined by the data analysts to be non-successful. Fields 19 and 20 furnish 
information on the time within the launch when the failure occurred (ANOM TIME) 
and its units of measure (TIME MEAS). Details, when appropriate, on the-stage, 
system, subsystem and component that failed are given in Fields 21-24. Field 25 
(FAIL-MODO contains failure mode data for the lowest-indentured identified failure 
item. Also, information regarding the results of the failure analysis is furnished in Field 
26 (FAIL - ANAL). 
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Several categories of failure root causes were used in assessing the launch vehicle 
failures contained in the database. These include abnormal equipment stresses, poor 
workmanship, defective materials, operator or human error and design deficiencies. 
In most cases the launch performance records do not provide sufficient information as 
to the failure root cause, however, in several instances the information is  inferred. 
Field 27 (ROOT - CAUSE) contains information on identified failure root causes. 
To support potential future common cause and dependent failure analyses that may 
be performed, information on related failures are supplied in Field 28 (CMMN FAILR). 
Data page numbers (DATA PAGE) of other launches exhibiting simila; failure 
characteristics are included in-this field. 
Meteorological ,conditions at the time of the launch are described in Field 29 
(MET - COND). In addition, Field 30 furnishes comments and remarks deemed 
appropriate by the data analysts. Typical comments might address unique features 
pertaining to the launch. 
Number of data records: 714 
Field 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Field Name 
VEH-PROG 
VEH-GEN1 
VEH-GEN2 
ENCD-PAGE 
DATA-PAGE 
LNCH-DATE 
LNCH-T IME 
TIME-STD 
FLT-DUR 
DUR-UNITS 
RANGE 
RANGE-UNIT 
INCLNTN 
INCL-UNIT 
VEH-CNFG 
RSO-EVAL 
ANOM-TIME 
TIME-MEAS 
STAGE 
SYSTEM 
SUBSYS 
COMPNT 
FAIL-MODE 
FAIL-ANAL 
ROOT-CAUSE 
CMMN-FAILR 
MET-COND 
COMMENTS 
LNCH-FRM 
ANL-EVAL 
Type 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Date 
Character 
Character 
Numeric 
Character 
Numeric 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Memo 
Character 
Character 
Numeric 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Memo 
Memo 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Memo 
Width 
50 
30 
25 
6 
6 
12 
8 
16 
3 
10 
8 
11 
6 
8 
10 
10 
1 
1 
18 
6 
20 
32 
90 
90 
10 
10 
65 
25 
60 
10 
Dec Index 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
2 N 
N 
2 N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
2 N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
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Launch 
Period 
Covered in 
Database 
Launches 
Covered in 
Database Launch Vehicle 
Database 
Diskette 
Atlas 
Brilliant Pebbles 
Delta 
I1 
vl 
I 
1957-1 963 
1982-1988 
1957-1965 
1991 
199 1 - 1993 
46 
43 
140 
1 
4 Red Tigress 1 & 11 
Space Shuttle 
Starbud 
TMD 
Countermewire 
Vanguard 
VI 
VI 
VI 
VI 
VI 
1981-1993 
1990 
1993 
1956-1959 
45 
1 
2 
14 
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Table 3-3. Commehensive Data EncodinP Database 
Individual 
Database 
File Prominent Vehicle Configuration in 
Database - 
saturn.dbf 1961 -1970 I 20 2 or 3 liauid stages w/ Lunar module. 
atlas.dbf 1 '/, liauid stages with Centaur or Asena umerstage. 1957-1993 
1960-1992 
~ 
CASTOR IV-A 1st stape. ORBUS 2nd stape. otrlv .dbf 
delta.dbf 3 liquid stages wl various quantities of strap-on 
CASTOR SRMs. 
eemini.dbf 1964-1965 1 3  2 liauid stages. Gemini 
JupiterNuno jupjuno.dbf Liquid 1st stage, down-scaled Sergeant 2nd and 3rd 
stages. 
2 stage solid propellant rocket. 
Sub-launched 2 stage solid propellant missile. 
Single stage CASTOR IV-A solid rocket motor. 
TALO 1st stage, Sergeant 2nd stage, M57A1 3rd 
stage. 
Integrated Shuttle Vehicle, External Tank, 2 SRBs. 
TALO 1st stage, Sergeant 2nd stage, Orbus 3rd stage 
and Star 2OB 4th staee. 
prshng2.dbf 
polaris.dbf 
Pershmg Il 
Polaris 
Proswctor I v l  otrlv.dbf 
otrlv.dbf 
sts.dbf 
otrlv.dbf 
- ~~ ~~ 
TALO 1st stage, Minuteman 12nd stage. otrlv.dbf 
Viking sounding rocket 1st stage, Aerobee sounding 
rocket 2nd stage, SRM third stage. 
vngrd.dbf - 
I 714 TOTAL 1 
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3.2.2 Risk and Reliability Database 
Risk and reliability figures of merit computed as a part of analyzing the 45th Space 
Wing data are stored in its own separate database file distinct from the Data Encoding 
database files. This includes a compilation of computed data and facts on the various 
vehicles and their components listed in Table 3-3. The database includes the 
following: vehicle identification, vehicle code, vehicle element; equipment 
description, failure severity, listing of failure modes, notebook related data pages, the 
number of failures, the number of records, mean and median reliability estimates, 95th 
and 5th upper and lower confidence boundaries, and error factors. Appendix B 
contains a printout of the complete space flight Risk and Reliability database. 
The Risk and Reliability database is related or associated with the Data Encoding 
database through the inputs provided in the "Related Data Pages" field. The unique 
page identifiers show the pages in the data encoding notebooks from which the 
information was derived. These same page numbers are included in the Data 
Encoding database in the "Data Page" field. A single 3'/2 inch highdensity diskette 
houses the complete Risk and Reliability database file. 
4.0 OVERVIEW OF LAUNCH VEHICLES 
Table 3-3 depicts the fourteen launch vehicles or missiles contained in the database. 
Provided herein, where appropriate, is a brief overview and description of the launch 
vehicles addressed. In several cases very little information is  available on the newer 
vehicles and thus only a sparse description can be provided. In other cases, a very 
good overview and summary is available for many of the common launch vehicles. 
4.1 Atlas 
The Atlas space launch vehicles, manufactured by General Dynamics, derived from the 
Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) series developed in the early-1 950s. The 
primary one and one-half stage vehicle has played a major role in early lunar 
exploration activities. In particular, the early unmanned Ranger, Lunar Orbiter and 
Surveyor programs used Atlas vehicles. Also, the Mariner and Pioneer planetary 
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probes were launched by Atlas vehicles. 
Figure 4-1 depicts the Atlas evolution starting with the LV-3A in 1958 up to the IlAS 
in 1993. A description of the vehicle configurations is  summarized in Table 4-1. The 
Atlas A, B, and C were developmental ICBMs. Atlas D, E, and F configurations were 
deployed as operational ICBMs during the 1960s. During that time, some Atlas Ds 
were modified as space launch vehicles in the LV-series. LV-3A, 3B, and 3C launch 
vehicles evolved from a modifiction of the basic D’s vehicle structure and subsystems. 
out of 
Production 
LV.34 
%z 
u v 4  
%z 
E 
% 
Figure 4-1. Atlas launch Vehicle Configurations6 
The Standardized Launch Vehicle (SLV) series derived from a need to reduce lead 
times in transforming Atlas missiles to space launch vehicles. The SLV-series began 
with the SLV-3 vehicle, which used an Agena upper stage. From the SLV-series 
evolved the E, F, G and H vehicles. Eventually the I, I t ,  IIA and IIAS configurations 
were developed with the aim of also supporting commercial launches. 
%raphics source: International Reference Guide to %ace Launch Svstems, Steven J. 
Isakowitz, 1991 a 23 
NASA Headquarters, Code Q 
RISK AND RELIABILITY DATABASE 
Dimensions International, Incorporated 4501 Ford Avenue, Suite 1200 Alexandria, Virginia 22302 
Atlas vehicles are fueled by a mixture of liquid oxygen (LOX) and kerosene (RP-1). 
Later configurations, such as, the IlASs also incorporate Castor IVAs solid rocket motors 
to provide added lift. The Atlas liquid fuel booster propulsion is  provided by the 
Rocketdyne engine system, which includes a sustainer, vernier and two booster 
engines. In the Atlas II, HA, HAS vehicles, the vernier engine was replaced with a 
hydrazine roll control system. Al l  engines are ignited prior to liftoff. During flight the 
booster section is  jettisoned and lift is maintained by the sustainer engine until 
propellant depletion. Atlas vehicles are typically integrated with the Centaur 
upperstage vehicle. However, earlier flights used the Agena upperstage. Atlas is 
separated from the Centaur inflight by a pyrotechnic flexible linear shaped charged 
system attached to its interstage adapter. 
Preliminary results from this study show that the Atlas i s  a moderately reliable launch 
vehicle. Its overall mean success rate i s  computed to be approximately 75%. 
Table 4-1 . Atlas Configuration Descrbtions 
Initially ICBM (19601, then a reentry test vehicle (19641, then a space launch 
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Description 
LV3C 
SLV3C 
SLV-3D 
G 
H 
I 
II 
I IA 
I IAS 
Launched with Centaur D upper stage. 
Same as LV-3C except stretched 51 inches. 
Same as SLV-3C except Centaur upgraded to D-1A and Atlas electronics 
integrated with Centaur (no longer radio guidance). 
Same as SLV-3D but Atlas lengthened 81 inches. 
Same as SLV-3D except with VF avionics and no Centaur upper stage. 
Same as G except strengthened for 14 ft payload fairing, and ring laser gyro 
added. 
Same as I except Atlas lengthened 108 inches, engines uprated, hydrazine 
roll control added, verniers deleted, and Centaur stretched 36 inches. 
Same as It except Centaur RL-10s engines uprated to 20K Ibs thrust and 6.5 
seconds Isp increase from extendable RL-10 nozzles. 
Same as HA except 4 Castor IVA strap-on SRMs added. 
4.2 Brilliant Pebbles 
The Brilliant Pebbles launch vehicle is  comprised of a Castor IV-A solid rocket motor 
first stage, an ORBUS 1 second stage, a GuidancdControl/Avionics (GCA), and a 
forward payload. Using monocoque and semi-monocoque structure design, Brilliant 
Pebbles is a relatively recent deployed launch vehicle. Only one launch is  noted in 
the enclosed database files. The one launch noted in the database resulted in a 
catastrophic launch vehicle failure. 
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4.3 Delta 
The Delta launch vehicle, developed by McDonnell Douglas Corporation, evolved 
from the U.S. Air Force’s Thor Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) program 
(ref. Figure 4-2). The original Delta had a capacity for launching 100 pounds to 
Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO). Over the years it has continually matured and 
improved to support larger payloads. The current Delta II vehicles have a capacity of 
placing payloads in excess of 4,000 Ibs in GTO. Delta evolution is summarized in 
Table 4-2, where its various configurations are shown. 
I 
out of 
Production 
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Figure 4-2. Delta Launch Vehicle Configurations’ 
As evidence by the information in Table 4-2, Delta has undergone several changes 
since its maiden launch in 1960. The 1960 Delta used a reconfigured Thor booster 
with a Rocketdyne MB-3 engine as its first stage, an Aerojet AJl O-1 18 second stage, 
and the Vanguard X-248 solid rocket motor as the third stage. Considerable changes 
occurred thereafter. Many modifications involved the use of additional strap-on solid 
rocket motors to accomodate increased payload capacities. Other changes have 
Graphics source: International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, Steven J. 7 
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Modified Modification 
Stage 
included stretched fuel tanks; and improved first, second, and third stage engines. 
Delta 1 Modified Thor, MB-3 Block I engine. 
2 
3 Vanguard X-248 motor. 
Vanguard AJ10-1 1 18 propulsion system. 
d L 
Contemporary Delta designs incorporate a first stage with an engine system housing 
the Rocketdyne RS-27 main engine, and two Rocketdyne LR101 -NA-1 1 vernier 
engines. The first stage contains the aft attachments for the strap-on solid rocket 
motors. The RS-27 main engine provides a thrust capacity of 207,000 Ibs. The two 
vernier engines furnish roll control during the main engine burn, and attitude control 
after main engine cutoff (MECO) and before second stage separation. Added thrust is 
provided by the strap-on solid rocket motors. 
Delta’s second stage uses the Aerojet A l l  0-1 18K engine fueled with nitrogen tetroxide 
and Aerozine 50 (A50) storable propellants. Gaseous helium is  used for 
pressurization, and a nitrogen cold gas jet system furnishes attitude control during 
glide intervals and roll control during powered flight. Gimbals are hydraulically 
activated to provide pitch and yaw control. 
The third stage uses a Star-48B solid rocket mounted on a spin table. Prior to third- 
stage deployment, the stage and spacecraft are spun-up using spin rockets that rotates 
the assembly on a spin bearing. An ordnance sequencing system i s  used to release the 
third-stage and spacecraft after spin-up, when the Star-48B is ignited and to separate 
the spacecraft following the motor burn. 
Delta has proven to be a highly reliable launch vehicle. Its estimated mean success 
rate, calculated from data herein, is about 94%. 
Table 4-2. Delta Modifications 
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Modified 
Stage 
1 
2 
3 
PLF 
0 
0 
1 
2 
3 
PLF 
3 
1 
3 
0 
0 
2 
0 
3 
0 
3 
PLF 
Modification 
Engine replaced with MB-3 Block II. 
Tanks lengthened, higher energy oxidizer used. 
Replaced with Scout X-258 motor. 
Bulbous replaced low drag. 
Added 3 Thordeveloped solid rocket motors (Castor I) 
Castor II replaced Castor 1. 
MB-3 Block 111 replaced Block II. 
Propellant tanks widened. 
Replaced with USAFdeveloped FW-4 motor. 
Fairing enlarged to 65 in. diameter (from Agena). 
TE-364-3 used. 
Tanks lengthened, RP-1 tank widened. 
Varied - FW-4 (L). TE-364-3 (MI. None(N) 
Six Castor I I  used. 
Nine Castor II used. 
Replaced with Transtage AJlO-118F engine. 
Six Castor It employed. 
TE-364-4 used. 
Nine Castor II. 
Varied - None (1 91 01, TE-364-3 (1 91 31, TE-364-4 (1 91 4). 
96 in. diameter replaced 65 in. 
28 
NASA Headquarters, Code Q 
RISK AND RELIABILITY DATABASE 
Vehicle 
Dimensions International, Incorporated 4501 Ford Avenue, Suite 1200 Alexandria, Virginia 22302 
Modified Modification 
Stage 
Delta 2310, 
2313 
Delta 2910, 
2913,2914 
Delta 3910, 
3913, 3914 
Delta 3920, 
3924 
Delta 4920 
Delta 5920 
Delta 6925 
Delta 7925 
0 Three Castor II. 
1 RS-27 replaced MB-3. 
2 TR-201 engine replaced AJ10-118F. 
3 
0 Nine Castor II. 
3 
0 
3 
2 
3 
0 
1 MB-3 replaced RS-27. 
1 RS-27 replaced MB-3 engine. 
1 Tanks lengthened 12fi. 
3 STAR 488 motor used. 
PLF Bulbous. 114 in. diameter used. 
0 GEMS replaced Castor IVA. 
1 
Varied - None (2310), TE-364-3 (23131, TE-364-4 (2314). 
Varied - None (2910), TE-364-3 (291 31, TE-3644 (2914). 
Nine Castor IV replaced Castor II. 
Varied - None or PAM (391 0), TE-364-3 (391 31, TE-3644 (391 4). 
AJl O-1 18K engine replaced TR-201. 
Varied - None or PAM (39201, TE-364-4 (3924). 
Castor IVA replaced Castor IV. 
RS-27A replaced RS-27 (1 2:l expansion ratio). 
4.4 Gemini 
Development of the Gemini launch vehicle focused primarily on putting man in orbit. 
The launch vehicle consisted of two liquid stages, fueled with hydrazine and UDMH 
propellant. It included the Aerojet’s propulsion system which was comprised of XLR, 
87-7 and XLR 91-7 engines, producing thrusts of 430,000 Ibs and 100,000 Ibs 
respectively. 
29 
NASA Headquarters, Code Q 
RISK AND RELIABILITY DATABASE 
Dimensions International, Incormrated 4501 Ford Avenue, Suite 1200 Alexandria, Virginia 22302 
Only three launches are noted in the database. All three were completely successful. 
4.5 J u pi ter/l u no 
Evolving out of the Redstone and Jupiter IRBM programs, Jupiter/Juno was developed 
in the early 1950s. Jupiter’s initial configuration (Jupiter C) included a slightly longer 
stage one tank than the Redstone, 37.5 ft instead of 32.08 ft. The Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL) developed the second stage, which consisted of a cluster of 11 scaled- 
down Sergeant missiles, each 4 feet long and 6 inches in diameter. Each missile 
provided 1,600 Ibs of thrust. Similarly, the third stage was comprised of three more 
scaleddown Sergeant missiles. 
By the late 1950s Jupiter was modified into Juno II as a means of providing a greater 
orbital capacity. As a first stage, the )uno used a Jupiter IRBM measuring 58 ft long 
and 105 inches in diameter. This stage used a Rocketdyne engine that burned LOX 
and RP-1 in providing 150,000 Ibs of thrust. As with its predecessor, Juno II used the 
JPLdeveloped second stage consisting of a cluster of 1 1 scaleddown Sergeant missiles. 
The Jupiter/Juno series achieved two significant milestones in U.S. space flight. First, 
the Jupiter C was the first successful launcher of a U.S. satellite, Explorer 1 on February 
1, 1958. Second, Juno II with Pioneer 3 as a payload, provided the first successful 
U.S. flyby of the Moon on December 6, 1958. 
All JupitedJuno launches occurred at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida 
launch site. Thus, the database contained herein represent one of the few sources 
where launch information on these vehicles have been captured and organized. 
Based on the data acquired herein, Jupiter/Juno is  said to have achieved moderate 
reliability results. Its estimated mean success rate is computed as 67%. 
4.6 Pershinn II 
The Pershing II is  the second generation of the Pershing missile developed by Martin 
Marietta Orlando Aerospace Company. With a height of 35 feet, the two-stage solid 
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propellint rocket, typical payload included a terminally guided nuclear warhead. With 
an improved guidance system, the Pershing II was far more accurate than its Pershing 
I predecessor. It housed a radar system in its nose cone that compared target imagery 
with prestored computer images for inflight course adjustments. The medium-range 
missile, had a maximum range of 1200 miles and was primarily launched from mobile 
launchers at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. 
Unlike most missile programs, Pershing II was developed and produced concurrently. 
Several missiles were designated for "hot-shot" launches which implied the missiles 
were exposed to several hours of prelaunch environmental stresses. Typically this 
required the missile undergo two weeks of land-based manuevers, where it was driven 
over 1500 miles of dirt and paved roads and put through 50 countdown sequences. 
It was then broken down into its major parts, returned to the Missile Command at 
Redstone Arsenal and placed into a chamber where temperatures ranged from 1 10 to 
160 degrees during a fourday period. The process was repeated, and then the 
missiles were kept at a constant 135 degrees for five days, followed by a "cold-soak" 
of the rocket motors at 5 degrees below zero for five days. Finally, the entire missiles 
were maintained in a heated plywood shelter at Cape Canaveral at a constant 91 
degrees for two weeks before launch. 
With a computed mean success rate of 95%, the Pershing I 1  proved to be highly 
reliable. Only two of the 43 launches documented in the database ended in a 
catastrophic fai I ure. 
4.7 Polaris 
The submarine launched Polaris ICBM weighs approximately 66,000 pounds and has 
a range of roughly 1,100 nautical miles. The two stage solid rocket missile contains 
an inertial guidance system. The payload is  a reentry body, normally a warhead. 
Typically the missile is  launched from a tube in the submarine, while the submarine 
is submerged. The missile i s  ejected from the launch tube with pressurized air and is  
forced to the surface where the first stage is  ignited. It is guided to its target by the 
inertial guidance system. Once ejected, the missile does not require any commands 
(from either land-based stations or the submarine) to complete its mission. Missile 
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attitude is controlled by the use of several jetevators for the first stage and by a fluid 
injection thrust vector control system for the second stage. 
4.8 ProsDector (loust) 
Prospector is  a sophisticated guided single stage CASTOR IV-A solid propellant rocket 
designed to deliver small payload into sub-orbital flight. The rocket contains five 
primary elements including the nosecone, payload module, service module, Castor IVA 
motor and Aft skirt assembly. Housed inside the nosecone is a recovery system, 
floatation aid and recovery beacon and antennas. Similarly, the service module 
contains the Guidance and Control Computer (GCC), PCM Encoder, Rate Control 
System, Flight Termination, Inertial Guidance System, Telemetry system, and 
Electronics. The aft skirt assembly included a stabilization flare, air and jet vanes, and 
actuators. 
4.9 Red Tinressl & II 
Red Tigress I i s  a guided single stage solid propellant rocket designed to deliver small 
payloads into sub-orbital flight. The 29 ft. missile includes a nosecone section, 
payload module, M56A1 solid propellant motor and fin/aft skirt structure. A Nozzle 
Control Unit (NCU) is used to guide the single stage missile. 
Red Tigress II consists of an unguided first stage Talos with a guided second stage 
Sergeant and guided third stage M57A1. The unguided first stage requires wind 
weighting techniques up to second stage ignition. The second stage Sergeant is guided 
using a combination of air and jet vanes mounted in the aft skirt structure. The third 
stage M57A1 is fully guided using a NCU and four vectorable nozzles. 
Red Tigress II has a separation system that includes V-bands with pyrotechnic release 
mechanisms for staging of the Talos, Sergeant and M57A1 motors, separation of the 
nose, and release of the payload module. It also includes a standardized guidance and 
control avionics package used by both the launch vehicle and the payload module 
attitude control. 
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a 
4.10 Saturn 
Saturn V was the last in the Saturn series which included Saturn I, Saturn IB and Saturn 
V. It included a S-IC first stage, a S-ll second stage, a S-IVB third stage and an 
Instrumentation Unit (IU). Before its phase out in 1975, the Saturn vehicle 
accomplished several significant events including the Apollo missions to the moon and 
several rendezvous trips to the Skylab station. 
Saturn’s S-IC stage was developed by Boeing Company and it contained five F-1 rocket 
engines. These engines were the most powerful liquid propellant engines ever flown. 
Rockwell designed and built the S-ll second stage which was powered by five J-2 
engines. Propellants for the J-2 engines were carried in a single fuel tank with a 
common bulkhead design and included an associated propellant utilization system to 
monitor propellant consumption. The McDonnell Douglas S-IVB third-stage was 
powered by a single 1-2 engine. This stage also incorporated a single propellant tank 
with a common bulkhead design and a propellant utilization system. Major vehicle 
electronic units were housed in the Instrumentation Unit which was developed by 
IBM. These included telemetry, communications, tracking and crew safety systems. 
4.1 1 %ace Shuttle 
The Space Shuttle consists of a reusable delta-winged orbiter vehicle; two reusable 
solid propellant rocket boosters; and an expendable external tank containing liquid 
fuel for the orbiter’s three main engines. Four orbital configurations are contained in 
NASA’s inventory including Columbia, Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavor (replacement 
vehicle for the Challenger). The shuttle’s maiden launch took place on April 12, 1981 
with a successful Columbia flight. Twenty-three subsequent flights were also 
successful up to the Challenger accident which took place on January 28, 1986. 
The delta-winged orbiter vehicle is designed as a reusable space transport vehicle. It 
contains a crew compartment which can accomodate up to seven crewmembers. It 
also has a 60 by 15 ft cargo bay which can accomodate payloads to be orbited in 
space or the spacelab module for conducting microgravity experiments. Propulsion 
i s  provided by the three Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) located in the aft 
fuselage. Fuel for the SSMEs are contained in the External Tank. Added in-flight thrust 
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is provided by the two solid rocket boosters which contribute 80 percent of the Space 
Shuttle’s total lift-off thrust. 
4.12 Starbird 
The Starbird consists of a Talos solid rocket first stage; a Sergeant solid second stage; 
an Orbus I third stage and a Star 20B fourth stage. The rocket includes a release 
hinged compression band fairing which houses the payload. It was designed to 
support the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program by testing sensor suite ability and 
its capability for performing acquisition, track and discrimination. Only one launch 
is noted in the database. 
The Talos solid rocket first stage is  manufactured by Hercules. The solid rocket was 
originally developed as the boost phase propulsion system for the AIM-8 Talos surface 
to air missile (SAM). It has since been incorporated into several launch vehicle 
designs. 
4.13 TMD Countermeasure 
Early configurations of the TMD Countermeasure launch vehicles included a Talos first 
stage; a Minuteman I (Aries) second stage; a vented interstage unit connecting the two 
stages and a payload module assembly. The payload module include the guidance 
control and avionics (GCA) and flight test experiments (i.e., targets). In addition, the 
rocket includes a reentry vehicle. Four fins are attached to the aft end of the Talos and 
Aries motors for aerodynamic stability. 
4.14 Vanguard 
The Vanguard rocket was derived from the Viking, a scientific sounding rocket whose 
technology grew out of the V-2 program. Viking was modified into the Vanguard 
through modifications which increased its capacity and added upper stages. Other 
changes included using a General Electric thrust motor in the first stage and switching 
from LOX and alcohol to LOX and RP-1 for fuel. The second stage, developed by 
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Aerojet, modified the Navy’s Aerobee sounding rocket to produce 7,500 Ibs of thrust 
using UDMH and white fuming nitric acid as propellants. A new solid-fuelded rocket, 
developed by AI legany Ballistics Laboratory (ABL) of the Hercules Powder Company, 
was used as the third stage. 
5.0 SUMMARY 
The database files provided herein furnish sufficient information for conducting 
preliminary reliability and risk analyses on aerospace equipment. The databases can 
be sorted and query functions enacted to summarize specific pieces of information on 
component, subsystem, system and vehicle failures. Examples of the types of failure 
information that can be derived from the databases are given in the succeeding 
sections. 
An useful risk and reliability database will always remain in an incomplete state. 
Incomplete databases allow for growth and continuous improvements through the 
addition of better information over time. The database files furnished herein are 
incomplete, however, as noted previously, sufficient information is contained in them 
to support the performance of some preliminary reliability analyses. For example, 
failure totals and probabilities can be obtained which identify prominent equipment 
failures and offer some insight into failure trends. Through the use of the database 
query commands failure totals and probabilities for specific LV, system, subsystem and 
component types can be quickly acquired. 
5.1 Failure Summary 
Table 5-1 provides a summary of the failure totals comprised in the Risk and Reliability 
database. This information is  also presented in Figure 5-1 in the form of a pie chart. 
Table 5-1 outlines the number of launch failures by severity. Thus, based on the 71 6 
launches documented in the Data Encoding database, 21 9 (or 30.6%) were deemed 
as failures or partial failures by the DVSAIC data analysts. Out of the 21 9 failures, 146 
were catastrophic, 44 degraded, 25 incipient and four were classified as unknown. 
The lightly shaded areas in the pie-chart highlight the proportion of failures typically 
overlooked in performing reliability analyses. Reliability engineers primarily consider 
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146 
44 
25 
4 
catastrophic failures, however, the inclusion of the failures in the gray areas (i.e., 
degraded, incipient and unknown) provide a more accurate reflection of the vehicle’s 
performance. 
Table 5-1. Total launch Failures 
Failure Severity 
Number of 11 
Failures 
Total 21 9 II 
5.1.1 launch Vehicle Failure Probabilities 
Figure 5-2 shows the computed failure probabilities and uncertainty bounds for the 
individual launch vehicles. Moreover, the graph depicts the level of information 
available in the Risk and Reliability database file. The diagram shows in a comparative 
format the estimated unreliability or failure probabilities for the vehicles. In addition, 
each estimate’s confidence bounds reflect the amount of data available in the database 
for the vehicle. Large confidence bounds, such as TMDC’s is  reflective of its small 
number of records contained in the database. Presently, the database contains 
information on only two TMDC launches which is reflected in the large uncertainty 
shown. 
In general, a graph such as TMDC’s i s  interpreted as meaning the estimated mean 
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Figure 5-1. launch failures in the database 
failure probability for TMDC i s  0.50. However, there is a 95% probability that the 
true failure probability is not greater than 0.975 and a 5% chance it is  not less than 
0.205. Conversly, Atlas' graph indicates that the estimated mean failure probability 
for Atlas is 0.251 with a 95% chance it is not greater than 0.305 and a 5% probability 
it i s  less than 0.203. This shows clearly that there is  much less uncertainty with the 
Atlas' estimate. This i s  expected since the Atlas estimate is based on many more 
records contained in the database. 
5.1.2 Generic Failure Totals 
Failure summaries for generic aerospace equipment can be obtained from the Risk and 
Reliability database. The phrase "generic" signify that equipment types, such as rocket 
engines, vary from vehicle to vehicle, but are grouped here under a common 
classification. Figures 5-3, 5-4 and 5-5 show the comparative failure totals for several 
generic launch vehicle systems, subsystems and components, respectively. Generic 
systems such as, Electrical, Flight Control, Guidance, Propulsion, Separation and 
Structural are displayed in Figure 5-3. There, the number of catastrophic, degraded 
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Figure 5-2. launch Vehicle Failure Probabilitv Estimates 
and incipient failures contained in the database for each system is shown. Moreover, 
the bar-graphs show the relative magnitude of failures for the systems. In addition, the 
graph shows that propulsion failures are predominate when compared to other 
systems. 
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Figure 5-3. Generic Svstem Failures 
Figure 5-4 depicts the failure totals for several generic subsystems including Fuel/feed, 
Hydraulic, Pneumatic, Solid Rocket Motor (SRM), Telemetery, and Termination. 
Information on other subsystems i s  also available in the database, but not shown here. 
Here, subsystems responsible for performing fuel distribution are the dominant failure 
contributors. 
A comparative look at the failure summaries for several different generic components 
is provided in Figure 5-5. Components depicted include engine, motor, pump, switch 
and valve. Here again, other component types are also contained in the database, but 
are not shown. 
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Figure 5-4. Generic Subsvstem Failures 
5.1.3 Failure Sequence 
Although only a limited amount of time-related failure information is available in the 
database, some measure of the relative time in the mission when failures occurred can 
be estimated. The Risk and Reliability database contains failure totals for the different 
vehicle stages. In particular, it has the number of failures (by severity) in the first, 
second, third, re-entry and other stage types. Figure 5-6 illustrates the summary of 
launch vehicle stage failures in a pie chart format. 
This is  not an accurate manner for estimating the specific time in the mission when a 
failure can be expected to occur. However, it does provide a relative measure in the 
sequence of events as to when the predominant number of failures might have taken 
place. Thus, most failures appear to have occurred within the first 2-3 minutes of the 
launch based on the large representation of first stage failures shown in Figure 5-6. 
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Figure 5-5. Generic ComDonent Failures 
Here, many of the vehicles contained in the database are recognized as having first 
stages that burn approximately 2-3 minutes in duration. 
5.2 Preliminary Analvsis 
The NASA "Space Flight Risk Data Collection andAnalysis" project has resulted in the 
accumulation of an unique data set acquired from the 45th Space Wing at Patrick Air 
Force Base (PAFB). This particular data collection enables preliminary analyses to be 
performed focusing on studying the current reliability trend of United States launch 
vehicles' performance. Recent national and global events related to a shake-up in the 
aerospace industry during the post-Cold War and U.S. deficit-reduction era, might be 
resulting in a negative or downward trend in U.S. launch vehicles' reliability. The 
constant turnover in aerospace personnel, with an associated erosion in the experience 
or knowledge-base, is  expected to lead to organizational confusion, training 
inadequacies and a loss of institutional culture and morale. Ultimately, a decrease or 
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Figure 5-6. Summaw of stage failures 
decline in launch vehicle performance and reliability can be expected. 
The results, based on this single data source, seem to support a downward or declining 
launch reliability trend. Although a single data source is  recognized not to be 
reflective of the entire national environment, preliminary results here might indicate 
that additional study is warranted. 
5.2.1 Preliminary Reliability Trend Analysis 
A preliminary launch reliability trend analysis is  conducted herein based on the use 
of the space flight data acquired from the 45th Space Wing at Patrick Air Force Base. 
The analysis includes performance data obtained on 14 launch vehicles covering 
approximately 700 launches. Table 3-3 provides an encapsulation of the launch 
vehicles considered in performing the launch reliability trend. 
The overall reliability trend for the 45th Space Wing launches i s  determined by first 
computing the ratio of successes (i.e., probability of success) for each vehicle covered 
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in Table 3-3. Figure 5-7 provides two graphs that depict the ratio of successes for the 
45th Space Wing launches. The first graph is  based on all vehicle failures. Conversly, 
the second plot is based solely on catastrophic failures. A moving weighted average 
of the vehicle launch reliability i s  determined to minimize the variation of reliability 
for each of the years shown in the total launch profile (Le., 1956 - 1992). A five-year 
moving average based on yearly reliability estimates is  used to minimize the 
fluctuations that could occur in a given year due to a small number of launches. 
Furthermore, a weighted moving average was applied to properly distribute the 
importance of reliability values for years having a large set of launches. 
Figure 5-7. 45th %ace Wing launch Record 
5.2.1.1 Weighted Moving AveraFe Reliabilitv 
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Considering previous time-period measurements (i.e., prior years), the weighted 
moving average’s approach is used to forecast the value for the next or succeeding 
time-period. The forecasted value is the weighted average of a fixed number of past 
values. 
If we let x, x2, ..., x, represent past time periods with observed values y,, y2’ ...,y, 
then the predicted value yn+, for the next time period, x,,~, is given by the expression 
below. Assuming that y, is the current time period. 
where 
and 
yn = current time period, 
k - number of time periods or measurements. 
The weighted moving average technique modifies the simple average approach shown 
above by smoothing data fluctuations and thus developing a trend. Each data value 
is replaced by the weighted average of itself and surrounding values. In this way, 
extreme fluctuations are minimized and the overall trend revealed. 
In computing the weighted moving average, we let k represent the number of samples 
on either side of a given data value used in the averaging. The averaged reliability 
estimates for the first and last periods are computed by repeating the first and last 
values, respectively, to obtain two points on each side of the end points for averaging. 
For a five year moving average, k equals two (2)  (i.e., two prior periods, the current 
period and two future periods), resulting in five values being averaged. Here, the 
weighted average value is  computed as shown below. 
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For the 45th Space Wing launch reliability, the weighting technique is based on the 
number of launches attempted for each given year. This results in reliability values 
determined from a large number of launches having a greater influence or carrying 
more weight than those derived from small launch years. Figure 5-8 displays the 
weighted moving average launch reliability values for the 45th Space Wing. The 
illustration shows a curve with an increasing or positive slope for the first 30 years and 
slight declining or downward slope for the reliability estimates plotted in recent years 
(i.e., 1990s). 
TOTAL LAUNCH VEHICLE RELIABILITY 
FIVE YEAR MOVING AVERAGE 
I - .I.* 
Figure 5-8. 45th SDace Wing Launch Reliabilitv 
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5.2.2 Relative Risk Analysis 
The computed relative risk is important and useful in comparing risks and in 
quantifying how a factor affects the system’s overall reliability. In general, when the 
risks R, and R, are estimated for two factors, respectively, the relative risk (RR) is the 
ratio R,/R,. In the case where only two factors are considered, a 2x2. contingency 
matrix approach can be used to figure the relative risk. The general approach for 
estimating the relative risk is presented below. 
When two factors are considered a 2x2 contigency matrix such as the following is 
constructed: 
Failure Non-Failure 
Factor Present ml 
Factor Absent 
X, is  the integer value counts for the observed data 
Corresponding to the observed data table is  the table of true, but unknown, underlying 
probabilities: 
Fai I ure Non-Fai lure 
Factor Present 
Factor Absent 
Thus, the estimated relative risk i s  given by the following: 
Here, the relative risk is defined to be a measure of the probability of a failure given 
that a factor i s  present to the probability of a failure, given that it is absent. Therefore, 
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41 
41 +42 
41 
R R =  
41 +42 
the relative risk is a ratio of these probabilities and is  given as: 
RR = P,/P, 
When RR equals one, the risk of failure i s  independent of whether the factor is  present 
or absent. Similarly, when RR equal ri then it is interpreted to mean that the 
probability of failure is ri times greater with the factor present than without it. 
5.2.2.1 Relative Risk of Unmanned Missions 
The above RR approach can be applied to estimate the relative risk of manned 
missions. From the Risk and Reliability database, information can be obtained on the 
number of manned mission failures compared to unmanned mission malfunctions. 
This information can be translated into an appropriate 2x2 contigency matrix. Fifty-six 
records in the Data Encoding database address manned missions. These include four 
Atlas, 45 Space Shuttle, and seven Saturn (Apollo) launches. Therefore, 660 records 
in the Data Encoding database address unmanned missions. Of the 56 manned 
missions, only one catastrophic failure is noted. However, two degraded and incipient 
failures each are also identified. Thus, a total of five failures of all types are noted for 
the 56 manned missions. The 660 unmanned missions include 145 catastrophic, 42 
degraded, 23 incipient and four unknown failures; for a total of 214. Translating the 
catastrophic failure information into a contigency matrix format results in the following: 
Failure Non-Fai lure 
Man Present 
Man Absent 
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This corresponds to the following underlying probabilities: 
Failure Non-Fai lure 
0.7803 
The relative risk is calculated as: 
. .  
(145) + (515) 
(1 45) 
. .  
(1 + 55) 
This is interpreted to mean that the probability of failure i s  12.3 times greater for 
unmanned missions as compared to manned missions. This reflects the improved 
reliability achieved in providing man-rated quality assurance programs for manned 
missions. 
5.2.2.2 Relative Risk of SRMs 
The above relative risk approach can be used to assess the risk of launch vehicles 
employing solid rocket motors. The Data Encoding database contain failure 
information on three vehicle types comprised of 1) liquid fuel only, 2) solid propellant 
only, and 3) combination of liquid and solids. Table 5-2 provides a breakdown of the 
vehicle types contained in the Data Encoding database. It shows the number of 
successes and failures identified for each vehicle. 
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Table 5-2. Summarv of Vehicle Twes 
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Failures 
Catastrophic Degraded incipient Unknown 
Vehicle Successes Total 
Total 218 38 19 8 4 287 
It I I I I II 
The corresponding 2x2 contigency 
constructed as follows: 
SRM Present 
SRM Absent 
matrix containing catastrophic failures is 
Fai lure Non-Fai lure 
-1 
The relative risk is  computed in the following way: 
t r  
(51) + (184) 
Since the relative risk is very close to one, the risk of failure is  independent of whether 
the launch vehicles employ SRMs or not. 
6.0 APPLICATION 
As mentioned previously, the primary purpose for developing the Risk and Reliability 
database is to provide a convenient source for locating risk and reliability data for use 
in conducting probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) and reliability analyses. Thus, the 
principal application of the enclosed databases is viewed as supporting future PRA and 
reliability studies. 
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6.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) 
In assessing risk the analyst attempts to envision how the future will turn out for a 
certain system if a certain course of action is undertaken. Thus, the risk analysis 
attempts to answer the following set of questions: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
What can happen? Or, what can go wrong? 
How likely is  it that the what can go wrong will happen? 
If it does happen, what are the consequences? 
In answering these questions a list of outcomes or "scenarios", as suggested in Table 
6-1 is  formulated. The ith line in Table 6-1 represents a triplet: <si, pi, xi >. 
where s, is a scenario identification or description; 
pi is the probability of that scenario; and 
x, is the consequence or evaluation measure of that scenario. 
Table 6-1. Scenario List 
Scenario Likelihood Conseauence 
P1 X l  
P2 x2 
If this table contains all possible scenarios, then it addresses the three questions 
mentioned above and is recognized as the risk. In general, risk is  defined as the set 
of triplets: 
R = {<si, pi, xi>}, i = 1, 2, ..., N. 
The information contained in the risk and reliability database, including failure 
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probabilities, failure descriptions, failure modes and root causes will assist PRA 
analysts in defining measures for the first two parameters (i.e., si and pi) in the set of 
triplets. 
6.2 Failure Mode Effects Analvsis (FMEA) 
The principal risk and safety methods used in the space industry are the failure mode 
effects analysis (FMEA), criticality analysis and hazard analysis. In general, the Risk 
and Reliability database provides an useful source in conducting the FMEA and 
criticality analysis. The FMEA is primarily hardware oriented and consists of evaluating 
the failure modes for individual components and assessing their effects. It is an 
inductive analysis that systematically details all possible component failure modes and 
their effects on the system. Typical component failure modes are provided in several 
reference sources. The compilation of these failure modes for specific space flight 
hardware is one of the principal aim of the risk and reliability database. 
6.3 Critical i tv Analvsi s 
Performance of a criticality analysis provides an useful technique for identifying 
component failures that pose significant safety problems. As part of the analysis 
method, component failure modes are rated in one of four criticality categories. The 
four categories' include: 
Category 1 : 
Category 2:  
Category 3: Failure resulting in potential delay or loss of 
Category 4: Failure resulting in excessive unscheduled 
Failure resulting in potential life. 
Failure resulting in potential mission failure. 
operational availability. 
maintenance. 
Component failure mode criticalities are ranked by computing a criticality number C, 
with the use of the following expression: 
'defined by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) in Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 926 
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where C, - 
n -  
N -  
A G  = 
a -  
8 -  
N 
Cr = paK#, x lo6, n = 1,2 ,..., N 
n=l 
criticality number for the system component in losses 
per million trials, 
critical failure modes in the system component that fall 
under a particular loss statement, 
last critical failure mode in the system component 
under loss statement, 
generic failure frequency of the component (e.g., 
failure probabilities contained in the Risk & Reliability 
database). 
operational factor that adjusts A, for the difference 
between operating stresses when A, was measured and 
the operating stresses under which the component is  
going to be used, 
environmental factor that adjusts A, for differences 
between environmental stresses when A, was measured 
and the environmental stresses under which the 
component i s  going to be used, 
fraction of A, attributable to the critical failure mode, 
conditional probability that the failure effects of the 
critical failure mode will occur, given that the critical 
failure mode has occurred. 
6.4 Adicat ion of Baves’ Theorem 
Typically in conducting a risk assessment there is  a need to acquire an estimate for the 
likely occurrence of a certain event, such as a solid rocket booster (SRB) rupture, for 
a specific vehicle type (i.e., vehicle m). In other words it i s  essential to know the 
frequency, @m of the event. 
Information on an event’s frequency of occurrence is generally regarded as falling into 
t h ree cat ego r i es: 
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(1) General background knowledge of the design and manufacture of the 
system, its operating conditions and environment, and so on. 
(2) Experience obtained thus far on the specific system. 
(3) Experience acquired on similar systems with similar vehicles (e.g., 
risk and reliability database). 
For a specific system, there might be fm occurrences (failures) in L, launches. 
Therefore, the type (3) information would consist of a set of doublets: 
< fi, Li > 
giving the experience of all vehicles which are deemed to be "similar" to the specific 
vehicle being studied. 
c, Ideally, these three types of information are combined into a single probability curve, 
p(e,,,/€) expressing the current state of knowledge about e,,,. The fundamental 
conceptual tool suited to this purpose is Bayes' theorem, which is  written as follows: 
where p(@,,,/E), the "posterior," is the probability assigned to ern after having evidence 
E; p(@,), the "prior," is  the probability given to @, before learning the evidence E; 
p(Vem), the "likelihood," is  the conditional probability that evidence E would be 
observed if the true frequency were actually e,,,; and p(E), is the prior probability of 
the evidence E. 
Based on Bayes' theorem, information types (1) and (3) represents the "generic" prior, 
~(9,). The vehicle specific information, type (2) constitutes the evidence, E and enters 
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the calculation through the likelihood function: 
The denominator in equation (4), p(E) is then the sum, or integral, of the numerator 
and ensures that the normalization of p(@,JE) is correct. 
In summary, Bayes’ theorem can be used in concert with the information contained 
in the Risk and Reliability database and other evidence that might be present about a 
given system to improve and refine the frequency of occurrence estimates. The 
Bayesean application provides a method to reduce or minimize the uncertainty 
boundary centered around the computed figures-of-merits. 
7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The DI and SAlC project team has made significant progress in extracting and 
synthesizing relevant RRAMS data from a limited data source, such as the 45th Space 
Wing. This is  evident by the compilation of information in the launch vehicle 
notebooks and database files. However, additional research will be required to make 
the database a more useful source in conducting probabilistic risk assessments and 
reliability studies. The present incomplete database files permit general analyses to be 
performed, primarily at the system and vehicle levels. However, more detail 
information on different component failure rates, failure modes and root causes would 
greatly enhance the database in supporting future risk assessments. In addition, the 
acquisition of data on other launch vehicles not presently contained in the present 
database files (e.g., Titan) would improve the coverage of different component types. 
Also, the acquisition of data from other sources beside the 45th 
necessary not only for the purpose of bolstering the database, but to 
Space Wing is 
provide a more 
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diverse compendium of space flight risk data. Since, launch vehicle processing 
contribute somewhat to space flight outcomes (i.e., success or failure), it would be 
advantageous to acquire data from more than one source besides the 45th Space 
Wing, since its single process style might bias the results contained in the Risk and 
Reliability database. 
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APPENDIX A 
DATA ENCODING DATABASE PARTIAL PRINTOUT 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
DOVAP & Ansa beacons 
1 and Dovap Ironsponders 
l2A GE Mark 2 Mod I R/V; MA- 1 Propulsion 
system; GE Mod II Guidance System: kuso 
lern; Azusa lransponder 
Azusa and Dovop Iransponders: range solely 
beacon ond commond system. 
Guidance Syslem; kusa and Dovap Mark II 
transponders; range safely beacon and 
Data 
Page - 
A1 
- 
A2 
- 
A3 
- 
A4 
- 
A5 
- 
A6 
- 
A7 
- 
Aa 
- 
A9 
- 
A10 
- 
A 1  1 
- 
A1 2 
- 
A1 3 
- 
A1 4 
- 
launch 
Dale 
- 
9/25/57 
imim 
imm- 
217/58 
2/20/58 
6/5/58 
jJ3/58 
7/19/58 
3/2/58 
lJ28/58 
3/14/58 
m7T 
TjTj5r 
I )I Eval. Rerna rks 
A drop in the fuel supply to  the 82 engine 
resulled in a drop in performance. This 
caused both engines l o  move hard-over as 
compensation. The missile was destroyed by 
RSO at 50.1 seconds. 
S Test number 1382. 
P Tesl number 1383. Impact indicated at less 
than 0.2 nm from target. 
, 
P Ted number 151 1. lmpacl indicated within 
one or two nm off Ihe target. 
lest number 1512. All syslems operaled 
sotisfaclorilv until affecled bv Ihe oroDulsion 
F 
11 system failire and explosion,' 
Test number 1513. lmpacl occurred al 
2300nm downrange. I 
Test number 1730. 
S Test number 1729. The only apparent 
discrepancy was excessive roll during the 
self-guided boosler phase. The probable 
cause is on incorrect operation of 
programmer switches which provide roll 
program input. 
S Test number 2501. 
f Test number 30 Since the complele 
airframe telemelery system was removed l o  
reduce weight. l t l le  informalion wos received 
as l o  the nature of the failure. - 
F 
- 
S 
- 
S 
A loss of liquid oxygen regulator reference 
pressure caused both engines performance 
level l o  drop to 40% of normal, 43.3 
seconds inlo the flight. Subsequently. bolh 
engines shut down due l o  LOX slarvation. 
The missile was destroyed at 74 seconds. 
A loss of one or m r e  phases of primary 
400 cycle AC power resutted in the abrupl 
cut off of a11 signals l o  and from Ihe ground 
at 85 seconds. 
Except for an electrical transient prior l o  
burnout, a11 systems operated satisfactorily. 
building up shortly before 100 seconds, and 
evenlually led to missile instability and 
breakup 
A- 1 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Vehicle 
IlAS 
llAS 
llAS 
ilAS 
itAS 
lips 
llAS 
ltAS 
TLAS 
(Partial Viewing) 
Generation I Canfiquratiin 
Dummy nosecone; XLR-8944- 1 Propulsior 
Syslem; Gyro Cannister Fliqhl Control 
System; GE Mod IB Radio Guidonce Syslem; 
kuso and Dovap Mark II transponders; rangt 
safely beacon and commnd system. I 
U 
I OB Dummy nosecone R/V; Rockeldyne 
ProDukion Svslem: Gvro Cannisler Fliahl 
Control Systim; o p e i - l o ~ p  GE ~ o d  IB 
Guildonce System; kusa and h a p  
lronsponders; S-band beacon: Range safely 
command system. 
Syslem; kusa  B and h o p  transponders; 
iC " GE Mark 2 Mod 1 f R/V; MA- 1 Propulsion 
Syslem; Mod Ill Radio-Inertial guidance 
system; k u s a  B Ironsponder 
Ill Radio-lnerlial Guidance Syslem: k u s a  B 
Ironsponder 
GE Mark 2 Mod 2A wah Sandia lesl package 
Rockeldyne MA-2; Mod Ill radio guidance 
14D 
11c 
1 OD 
GE Mark II Mod 2A R / V  w l h  Sanda lesl 
packaqe. 2 s lays .  Rockeldyne MA-2. Mod 
111 radio-inerllal guldonce syslem 
Mork 2 Mod 1At R / V  wilh Mod 8 dolo 
capsule, MA- 1 Propulsion Syslem. Mod 111 
R-K; system. kuso B and S-band 
lransponders 
MA-2 Propulsion System, GE Mod Ill E 
1 Guldance Syslem w l h  Round Autoptlol 
Data 
Page 
A1 5 
- 
- 
A1 6 
A1 7 
- 
A1 8 
- 
A1 9 
- 
A20 
- 
A2 1 
- 
A22 
A23 
- 
A24 
- 
A25 
- 
A26 
- 
A27 
- ua 
- 
A29 
- 
A30 
- 
Launch 
Dale 
11/28/58 
12/18/58 
12723/58 
1/15/59 
1/27/59 
2/4/59 
2/20/59 
J/18/59 
4/14/59 
5/18/59 
676/59 
i7mT 
tJ18J59 
8/11J59 
8/24159 
?gjr 
I loss of power Ot 124.78 seconds. 
for about one second. H then increased 
agoin and remained wrmol until about 105.4 
seconds when 1 obruplty slopped operotinq. 
This led l o  the 82 turbopump stoppinq and 
Ihe engines shutting down. Normal s 
S Erratic operalbn of S-band beacon. foilure 
of GE pulse beacon. 
F Test number 1564 I 
Tesl number 10. R V did no1 seporole. 
seconds ofler liftoff. 
d in pedormance of several major 
A- 2 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
I 
RTLAS 
ATLAS 
, 
18D Mark II M o d  I re-entry vehicle: one s lay  
Atlas booster 
220 Mork 3 Mod I re-entry vehicle; one stoge 
Atlas booster 
UtAS 
4TLAS 
GE MSVD Mark Ill Mod I re-entry vehicle; 
two-stage Allas booster 
Four-stage rocket. 
U H 
ULAS 43D GE MSVD Mork Ill Mod IX re-entry vehicle; 
one stage Allas booster 
ULAS 144D AVCO RVX-4A-2 re-entry vehicle; one 
stage Atlas boostel 
UlAS 
490 GE MVSD Mork 3 Mod l4 re-entry vehicle; 
one stage Atlas booster 
1 Mark Ill Mod IA re-entry vehicle; one stcqe 
I booslei I 
U 
ATLAS 1 4 8 0  Mork 111 Mod l4 re-entrv vehicle: one slow 
1 booster 
ATLAS 56D GE MSVD Mark 3 Mod IB re-entry vehicle; 
one stage Atlos booster I 
- 
Dala 
Paqe - 
A3 1 
- 
A32 
- 
A33 
- 
A34 
- 
A35 
- 
A36 
- 
A37 
- 
A38 
- 
A39 
- 
A40 
- 
A4 1 
- 
A12 
- 
A43 
- 
A44 
- 
A45 
A46 
- 
A47 
- 
A48 
A- 3 
Data Encoding: Database Records 
Generalion 
450 
54D 
620 
27D 
600 
SOD 
320 
66D 
76D 
79c 
300 
1E 
710 
55D 
530 
4E 
9 l D  
(Partial Viewing) 
Configuration 
 )ooster 
" 
lark 3 Mod 1B re-entry vehicle; one stage u A58 
\tlas booster 
lhree stage rocket 
\VCO Mark 4 Mod I nose cone: two-slaae 
moster 
U 
W - 2 A  re-entry vehicle; two-stage Atlas 1 A61 
moster 
Ulos booster 
4110s booster 
A- 4 
launch 
Dale 
- 
m/so 
m 
127/60 
12/60 
129/60 
/9/60 
112/60 
116/60 
119/60 
/25/60 
1/11/60 
3/13/60 
3/21/60 
1/15/60 
1/29/so 
2/15/60 
Remarks 
The booster performed satislaclorib. The 
satellite was pkxed in the proper posiion foi 
orbit. 
First flight lest for AIG system. Trajectory 
devioled grossly from planned. 
Test number 81. Guidance cutoff did not 
cause VECO. so the autopilol backup 
accomplished cutoff. Impact indicated 1 8nn 
downrange. 
Test number 1002. Missile lift off delayed 
4.8 seconds 10 increase probobilly of 
shutting down missile if combustion instobilit\ 
developed. 
Test number 803. 
lest number 1505. Mercury. 
Test number 1003. A previous attempt to 
lounch this missile on 8/2/60 met with 
automatic engine cutoff 1.53 seconds ofter 
sustainer flight lockin. 
Test number 1004. A special test was 
performed invoking the 102 and fuel tank 
repressurizolion. This was done since one of 
the three previous attempts at launch failed 
because of the repressurization problem. 
Test number 2817. The missile wos dry 
started with no additional hold-down time. 
lest number 802. 
Test number 2801. Able V. 
Test number 2508. 
A slight drop in engine performance just 
before BCO was noted but with no adverse 
affects. Test number 1502 
Test number 613. Missile flown without 
insulation and supporting bulkheod ol the 
inlermediole bulkhead. 
Test number 3503. 
Test number 2800. 
Test number 4508. ABLE 55. 
Data Encoding: Database Records 
A- 5 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
32E RVX-2A re-entry vehicle; one stage Atlos 
booster 
Mark 4 Mod 4 re-entry vehicle; one-stoqe 
Atlas booster 
1 
jF Mark 5 Mod 2 re-entry vehicle; one stage 
Atlas booster 
121D 
Mark 4 Mod 2A re-entry vehicle; one-stage 
Atlas boaster 
one-stage Atlas booster 
Atlas booster 
U 
I33D Atbs D booster; Aqena B upperstage; Ronqe 
spacecraft 
Atbs D booster: Centaur upperstoqe 
Mercury Aurora 7 capsule; one stw Atbs 
tmste; I 
Atlas D booster; A ~ M  B upperstage  
- 
Data 
Page 
A62 
- 
- 
A63 
- 
A64 
- 
A65 
- 
A66 
- 
A87 
- 
A68 
- 
A69 
- 
A90 
- 
A9 1 
- 
A92 
- 
A9 3 
- 
A94 
- 
A95 
- 
A96 
- 
A97 
- 
A98 
- 
A99 
Remarks 
lest number 1252. lmpoct about 1.5 nm 
md 0.4 nm from intended target. 
[est number 1804. Some information on 
Derformance sheet cutoff. 
lest number 3203. 
lest number 4507. Ranger RA-2. 
lest number 3751. First "F" series l o  be 
'lown with o lofted trajectory 
lest 1810. Mercury MA-5. Impact wos 
Jpproximoteb 8nm.long and 8nm left of the 
bominal impact point. 
lest number 5462. 
lest number 3752. 
lest number 5464. 
lest number 4501. 
lest number 125. Ranger RA-3. 
lest number 101. 
[est number 5460. Mercurv caDsule 
:ontained an astronaut. Mercury MA-6 
lest number 71. An explosion in the thrust 
section at 0.9 seconds was followed by o 
propellant explosion and missile destruction 
at 1.19 seconds. 
lest number 821. The spocecroft command 
system failed. 
lest number 5461. Centaur F-1. 
Test number 65. Impact 250 nm beyond tht 
planned impact area. 
lest number 2900. Mariner R-l capsule. 
A- 6 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Vehicle 
(Partial Viewing) 
ULAS 
lTlAS 
ZTLAS 
\TLAs 
\TLAS 
\TLAS 
\TLAs 
ULAS 
N A S  
1790 Atlas D booster; Aqena B upperstoge; 
Mariner R 
n 
BF Mark 4 Mod I re-entry vehicle; one-stage 
Atlas booster 
Mercury Sigma 7 copsule; one-stage Atlas 
booster 
Atlas 0 booster; Aqena B upperstage; Range 
spacecraft 
141 Mark 4 Mod 1B re-entry vehicle; one-stage 
Atlas booster 
16F Mark 4 Mod 1B re-entry vehicle; one stage 
Atlas booster 
? I F  Mark 4 Mod 16 re-entry vehicle; one-stcqe 
Atlas booster 
L 
134F [Atlas F booster; Chrysler REX-1 re-entry 
vehicle II 
I 
I35F II CS-2FT REX-2 re-entry vehicle; Atlas f 
booster I 
I300 Mercury f o i h  7 capsule; AMs D booster 
I 
197D Atlas LV-3A; Agena upperslay; S/N2 and 
S/N3 spacecrafts 
n 
136F IAt las F booster; WAC-1 re-entry vehicle 
booster 
Dala 
Page - 
A100 
- 
A101 
- 
A102 
- 
A103 
- 
A104 
- 
A105 
- 
A106 
- 
A107 
- 
AI08 
- 
A109 
- 
A1 10 
- 
A1 1 1  
A112 
- 
A113 
- 
A1 14 
A115 
At16 
- 
A117 
Remarks 
Test number 102. 
Test number 3731. Mariner R-11. 
Test number 103. Square autopilot system 
conligured with rate and displacement gyro 
spin motor rotation detectors. 
Test number 66. Mercury MA78 (manned). 
Test number 5050. The airborne auidonce 
rate beacon failure did not odversky affect 
Ihe llight. 
Test number 72. 
Test number 73. The suppression valve 
mispositioninq had no adverse effect on 
engine periormance. 
Test number 1906. 
Test number 119. 'Wet-start" yn i t im 
method used for the first time with the 
MA-3 propulsion system 
Test number 1501. 'Wet" start ignition. 
Test number 125. Mercury MA-9. 
Test number 5145. 
Test number 3686. The lirst attempt at 
launching this vehicle was scrubbed on 
10/26/63. due to  loss of the R/V C-band 
transponder during the countdown. 
Test number 5175. Hypergolic ignition lor 
boosters only. 
Test number 250. Missile configuration 
information not provided. 
Test number 150. First time Atlas used in 
the static test program (5E underwent 
equivalent 01 5 flights prior to  launch). 
Test number 0575. 
Test number 0225. launch site inlo not 
provided. 
A- 7 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Vehicle 
TLAS 
TLAS 
ILAS 
ILAS 
TLAS 
I t 6  
ILAS 
Generalion 
135D 
216D 
2MD 
1950 
289D 
2880 
146D 
169D 
156D 
D 
264D 
j l V - 3  
151D 
5lV-3 
1840 
1V- 3C 
SLV-3 
SLV-3 
(Partial Viewing) 
Test number 2925. li 
The Ranger 7 spacecroft was ploced in a 
circular lOOnrn parking orbit. The Agena 2n ‘Iburn placed il in a lunar transfer orbit. 
S Test number 4307. 
f 
S lest number 5099. Command destrucl 
removed from Agena. 
S Test number 9373. Performance record 
writing not loo clear. Connot make oul 
spacecroft nome. 
S Test number 0235. 
Most debris remained within 500 feet of pa( 
lest number 4003. I/ 
A- 8 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
Remarks - 
lest number 5739. 
lest number 1906. No mission objectives 
:ompromised. 
lest number 1469. 
'est number 8267. 
'est number 3424. 
'est number 4570. 
'est number 6950. Uncorrected surveyor 
mpact point. 
iest number 2935. 
lest number 4102. 
lest number 4213. Uncorrected Surveyor 
mpoct point. 
lest number 6622. 
lest number 7231. Uncorrected Surveyor 
mpact Point. 
iest number 2800. 
lest number 2020. Uncorrected Surveyor 
mpact Point. 
lest number 1384. 
[est number 3366. Sporse data. 
rest number 4920. Sparse Ma. 
Test number 4089. 
A- 9 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Vehicle 
.I 
ATLAS 
ATLAS 
ATLAS 
411AS 
4116 
4TLAS 
4TLAS 
4TLAS 
TLAS 
a1tAS 
\TLAS 
\TLAS 
ZTLAS 
ULAS 
ZTLAS 
ULAS 
4TLAS 
4TLAS 
I - 
Generation - 
S L V - x  
S L V - x  
SLV-3c 
SLV-3A 
SLV-3c 
SLV-3c 
SLV-3c 
S L V - x  
SLV- 3c  
S L V - x  
S L V - x  
SLV-3C 
S L V - x  
SLV- X 
SLV-3A 
SLV-3D 
SLV-3D 
SLV-3D 
(Partial Viewing) 
Configuration 
Atlas SLV-X booster; Centaur upperstage: 
Orbiting Astronomicat Dbservololy spocecraf 
Atlas SLV-X booster; Centaur 17D 
upperstaqe: Mariner Mars M69-3 
Atlas SLV-3C booster; Centaur upperstaqe; 
Mariner spacecraft 
Allas SLV-3A booster; Agena upperstage 
Atlas SLV-3C booster; Centaur upperstaqe; 
Applications Technobqy Satellite spacecrall 
Atlas SLV-3C booster; Centour 18D 
upperstaqe; Orbiting Astronomicat 
Observatory 
Atlas SLV-X booster; Centaur upperstoge 
Atlas SLV-3C booster; Centaur D upperstag 
Atlas SLV-3C booster; Centaur upperstage; 
Mariner 9 swcecraft 
Atlas SLV-3C booster; Centaur upperstaqe 
Atlas SLV-3C booster; Centaur upperstaqe; 
lntelsot N swcecraft 
Atlas SLV-3C booster; Centaur upperstqe; 
Spin Stabilized D e b  (SRM) 
Atlas SLV-X booster; Centaur upperstaqe 
Atlas SLV-3C boaster; Centaur upperstaqe; 
OAO-C spacecraft 
Atlas SLV-3A booster; Agena upperstaqe 
Atlas SLV-3C booster; Centaur second 
s t a y ;  Deita third staqe: Pioneer II 
spacecraft 
Atlas SLV-3D booster; Centaur upperstaqe; 
Intelsat N spacecraft 
Atlas SLV-3D booster; Centaur upperstaqe; 
Mariner 10 spacecraft 
Dola 
Paqe - 
AI 54 
- 
A155 
- 
A156 
A157 
- 
AI 58 
- 
AI 59 
A 1  60 
- 
A161 
AI 62 
- 
AI 63 
A I  64 
AI 65 
AI 66 
- 
A1 67 
- 
A I  68 
AI 69 
A170 
A171 
DI Eval. /I Remarks 
Test number 1711.  
Africa. 
Test number 2222. flight delayed 3 days 
due to shearinq winds at 30.000 feet. 
Test number 0366. 
Test number 3369. I 
A- 10 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
S Tesl number 3133. 
F Tesl number 2050. 
S Tesl number 3525. 
S Tesl number AFETR 2321. 
S Tesl number 2469. 
U 
S II Test number 8130. 
A- 11 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Vehicle - 
ATLAS 
AILAS 
4TLAS 
41LAS 
Generalion -
LV-3D 
LV-3D 
LV-3D 
LV-3D 
LV-3D 
LV-3D 
LV-3D 
LV-3D 
LV-3D 
LV-3D 
(Partial Viewing) 
Confquralion 
Atlas SLV-ID boosler; Cenlaur upperstage; 
FLTSATCOM F3 swcecrafl 
Atlas SLV-3D booster; Cenlour upperstage; 
FLTSATCOM f4 spacecrafl 
Allos SLV-3D boosler; Cenlaur uppersloge; 
lnlelsot V 
Allas SLV-3D booster; Cenlour upperstage; 
COMSIAR 0-4 swcecrofl 
Atlas SLV-3D booster; Cenlaur D-IAR 
upperslaqe; lntelsat V 
Allas SLV-3D booster; Cenlour D-1AR 
upperslaqe; FHsolcorn F5 
Atlas SLV-3D boosler; Cenlaur upperslaqe: 
Inlelsol V 
Allas SLV-3D booster; Centaur upperstage; 
lnlelsof V 
Atlas SLV-ID boosler; Cenlaur uppersloge; 
Intekal V; Inmarsol 
i l las SLV-JD booster; Cenlaur uppersloge; 
lnlelsot V lnmarsat 
Allas G boosler; Cenlaur D-IAR upperstage; 
lnlelsot V 
Rllas G boosler; Centaur D uppersloge; 
lntelsal VA 
Atlas G boosler; Cenlaur D upperslcqe; 
lnlelsot VA 
Allos G booster: Cenlaur D upperslcqe; 
lnlelsot VA 
Allos G booster; Centaur D upperstage; 
FLTSATCOM F2 spacecraft 
Atlas G boosler; Cenlaur D-1AR uppersloge; 
FLLTSAICOM 
Atlas I booster; Cenlaur upperslcqe; 
FLTSATCOM 
Dolo 
Page 
A190 
333 
- 
A191 
- 
A192 
A193 
A194 
- 
A195 
A196 
- 
A197 
A198 
A1 99 
A200 
A201 
- 
A202 
- 
A203 
A204 
A205 
- 
A206 
A- 12 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Generation 
I 
II 
IIA 
I1 
Den0 1 
DeHa 1 
DeHa 2 
Della 3 
lhor 295 - Thor De 
DeHa 5 
DeHa 6 
Della Big Shot #I  
DeHa 7 
(Partial Viewing) 
Confquralion 
4110s I booster; Centaur upperstaqe; CRRES 
spacecroft 
4110s II booster: Centour upperstaqe: 
:UTELSAT swcecraft 
4110s II booster; Centaur upperstage; DSCS 
;wecro f t  
Ztbs I booster; Centaur upperstage; BS-3H 
\tias I booster; Centaur upperstage; Galaxy 
j spacecraft 
Ulas IN booster; Centaur IN upperstage: 
ntelsat K 
Ztbs II booster; Centaur upperstaqe; DSCS 
;pacecroft 
Was I booster; Centaur upperstaqe; Galaxy 
IR 
Ulas I booster; Centaur upperstaqe; UHF 
:/o F-1 
k h o  1 
k h o  1 
:cho 1A 
liros II 
P-14 (Explorer I) 
liros Ill 
S-3 (Explorer XI11 
Tiros (4) 
Remarks - 
Test number 2914. 
Test number 5562. Commercial bunch. 
Operation number 8488. 
Operation number 9022. Destruct action 
token by FSO. Discrepancy reqordinq bunch 
date. 
Operation number 2299. Commercial launch. 
Operation number 6100. First Atlas IA 
launch. Commercial bunch. 
Operotion number 1935. Second CND Allas 
II bunch. 
Operation number 1049. Destruct action 
laken by FSO of 480 seconds. 
Operalion number D1047. Spacecraft 
achieved o low orbd because the Atlos 
booster gove minimum performance. 
Cause Unknown 
3rd stage failed to fire - thought to be 
caused by solenod switch along w l h  DC 
Converter wiring system 
Actual orbit 440 x 401 nmi 
Actual Orbit 41.790 x 157 nmi 
1 stage thor block I1 DAC model-DSV-20 
booster w/kusa xponder 
Actual orbit 457 x 384 nmi 
A- 13 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Remorks 
!ctual orb l  321 x 298 mi 
1 hr delay due l o  incorrectty wired lounch 
;equencer - rewired ond successfulty 
ounched. Actaul orbit 655 x 210 nmi. 53.9 
ncl 
%st LC-17B launch . 3000 x 500 nmi. 45 
!54 x 85 nmi apcqee 
584.1 x 369.1 nmi 
k tuo l  orbit 48174 x 150 nmi. 33.02', 
%st " A  configuration , DM-21 first stoge 
)Sed on Big Shots 
\dual orbit 3987 x 709 nmi. 47.24'. First 
'B" configuration. Al- IO- 118A second 
;loge 
'aylood called Explorer 17 here, Explorer 16 
n other sources (AIAA) , orb l  485 x 135 
imi  
Srbl 5700 x 500 nmi 
hctual orb l  165.688 x 105.7, 32.99' 
BTL is now called WECO Western Electris 
Company system). P / l  Llso colled Relay 
Cornmentory says burn interupled after 23 
sec, but Trajectory/Flight Plan indicates 
nominal burn time for stage 3. Assumes 
commentary is correct for Database table. 
(A- 16) 
A- 14 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Configuration 
(Partial Viewing) 
SYNCOM (3) 
IMP-B 
EPL-D (Energetic Padicles Explorer) 
Tiros -I (Tiros IX) 
os0 8-2  
COMSAT 1 (HS 303 A) 
IMP-C 
TIROS 01- 1 
oso-c 
GEOS A 
Pioneer - A 
TIROS 07-3 
TlROS 01-2 
AC-B 
AMP-D 
Pioneer B 
Data 
Page 
048 
- 
- 
D52 
D57 
D59 
D6 1 
D63 
065 
D67 
D69 
D7 1 
D73 
- 
075 
- 
D77 
079 
- 
D8D 
- 
D81 
- 
launch 
Dole 
- 
10/3/64 
12/21/64 
i/22/65 
!/3/65 
DI Evol. Remarks 
S Missle ped. record sheet calls 3rd stg 
ABL-XZ58-BZ. W write up calls il 
ABL-X258-A5(DM). 62 is consistent with 
other " D  bunch records - will use 82 
config summary. first "D In. first use of 
solid strap-ons. Actual orbit circular 19150 
nmi D 
A- 15 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Generalion - 
Della 42 
DeHa 43 
Den0 44 
3eHa 46 
D e b  47 
Della 50 
gena 51 
klla 52 
leHa 53 
lel la 55 
)e% 56 
IHORID/AGENA-9 
3eHa 51 
DeHa 58 
Della 59 
Deb 60 
DeHa 61 
(Partial Viewing) 
Conliquralion Remarks 
QDoaee Kick Motor IAKM) inol considered 
parl'of Della LV]. &e pahial lhrusl and 
GEO no1 achieved. t from P46 (Della 44) 
"Problem with first lntelsal (F-1) delermined 
lo  be cold apogee motor --- 
Reentry failure of payloud probabty no1 
attributable to LV failure 
first DeHo SI1 Reslarl. Capsule recovered 24 
hours early due l o  weather in recovery area 
Thus is a WTR launch (SLC-2)! 
This was a WTR launch (SLC-2) ! first RSO 
Deslruct of Della 
WTR LAUNCH! firs1 Della wilh explicit 
q u i n c e  equulions onbard  - llew slightly 
left of mmilxII till I t 7 5  sec, then nominal 
first M. Failure reminiscenl 01 
IHORAD/AGENA 9 (P55) 
Aclual Orbit 115,404 x 228nrni. 28.297' incl 
A- 16 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Ve hicle 
DELTA 
IELTA 
IELTA 
XLTA 
IELTA 
IELTA 
X L T A  
IELTA 
hELTA 
XLTA 
X L T A  
IELTA 
If LTA 
XLTA 
IELTA 
DELTA 
DELTA 
DELTA 
Generalion 
Della 63 
Delta 64 
Della 65 
Della 66 
Della 67 
Della 68 
THORAD/AGENA D 
Della 70 
Della 71 
Deb 72 
D e b  1 3  
DeHo 74 
DeHo 75 
Den0 77 
D e b  78  
DeHa 79 
Den0 80 
DeHa 82 
(Partial Viewing) 
Configuration 
.z 
lntelsot Ill C 
os0 r 
ISIS-A 
lntelsol Ill B 
TOS-G (TIROS Operational Satellite) 
lnlelsot Ill D 
CGD-F 
BIOS-D 
lntelsat 111 E 
DSO-G 
Pioneer E 
IDCSP/A (see comments) 
lntelsat Ill F-6 
NATO A Cornmunicatbns Spacecroft 
lntelsat 111 F-7 
lnlelsal 111 H 
Skynet A and Skynet E 
NATO B CommunKatians Satellite 
Data 
Page - 
Dl15 
- 
Dl16 
- 
Dl18 
- 
Dl19 
- 
D121 
- 
D123 
- 
0124 
0125 
D127 
D128 
D129 
- 
D131 
D134 
- 
D136 
D138 
D140 
- 
0141 
- 
D144 
A- 17 
Data Encoding; Database Records 
Generalion -
D e b  83 
DeHa 85 
DeHa 90 
DeHa 92 
DeHa 94 
Delta 95 
DeHo 97 
DeHa 100 
Delta 101 
Den0 102 
D e b  103 
D e b  105 
RHO 106 
Den0 108 
?eta 110 
Den0 112 
D e b  114 
D e b  116 
(Partial Viewing) 
Confiquraliin 
Explorer 43 SAT / IMP-I I 
OSO-H (primary) TETR (secondary payload) 
Drbd Interplanetary Monitoring Platlorrn 
Telesat A 
Telesat B 
RAE-B 
IMP-J 
SKYNET I1 A 
WESTAR A 
SMS A 
NESTAR B 
jKYNET I1 B 
jymphone A 
jMS A 
lElESAT C 
Symphoni B 
SOES A 
Dola 
Page 
D145 
- 
- 
D146 
- 
D147 
- 
D148 
- 
D149 
- 
D150 
- 
D151 
- 
0153 
- 
D155 
- 
D158 
- 
D161 
- 
D162 
- 
D165 
- 
D167 
- 
D168 
- 
D169 
- 
D170 
- 
D171 
- 
F 
- 
S 
- 
S 
- 
S 
- 
S 
Remarks 
irst time 6 SRMs used 
o Documentation - Generotion and 
onfiguration lrom AM 
ee Doto Page 154. also see Den0 106 
Hhauqh there is o Mema for Record 
ltoched. there is no relerence to the octuc 
lunch 
Hhough there is a Memo for Record 
Itoched. there is no relerence to the octuc 
lunch 
ne obnorml event during bunch. no eflec 
n boosters performonce. AM indicates 
munch on 10 OCT 74 
though there is o Memo for Record 
ltoched. there is no relerence to the octuc 
lunch. Generation and Configuration lrom 
M 
ee Data page 154. No relerence to  actual 
,unch 
o relerence l o  launch provided. Generatioi 
nd configuration lrom AM 
o reference to launch provided 
0 relerence to bunch Drovided 
o reference to launch provided 
ews article attached. it octualh covers UD 
iformat ion 
A- 18 
Data Encoding. Database Records 
Generation -
Delta 117 
DeHo 118 
Den0 119 
Della 120 
DeHa 121 
DeHo 122 
DeHa 124 
DeHa 125 
Della 127 
DeHa 128 
D e b  130 
DeHa 129 
Delta 131 
Delta 132 
k i l o  133 
DeHa 134 
DeHa 135 
(Partial Viewing) 
Confquratiin 
AE & f 
RCA-A 
CTS 
MARISAT A 
RCA B SATCOM 
NATO 111 A 
MARISAT B 
PALAPA-A 
MARISAT C 
NATO 111 B 
ESRO - GOES 
PALAPA- B 
GOES B 
GUS 
SIR0 
OTS 
ISEE A/B 
A- 19 
Data Encoding - Database Records 
Remarks 
Scrub on 20 NOV ond 21 NOV due to 
REDSTONE transmilling arm and destruct 
Sqnols 
Deluy for fauny seal on nose fairing door. 
Interesting launch (GSE) electrical power 
problem -Florida Power & Light backup 
generator, AlAA has bunch on 16 Jon 78. 
Memo for record - News clips 
Five (5) deloys - Two records on one page : 
OTS-B and GOES-C 
Iwo records on one page : OTS-B and 
GOES-C 
h e  doys late 
50 minute delay due to " A  Cyber Cornpuler 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Generolion 
DeHa 158 
DeHa 159 
Della 160 
Delta 161 
DeHo 162 
DeHa 164 
DeHa 165 
DeHo 168 
DeHa 170 
Della 171 
Della 172 
DeHa 173 
DeHa 175 
Delta 176 
Della 177 
DeHo 178 
DeHa 179 (?) 
DeHo 180 
(Partial Viewing) 
A- 21 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
Configurolion 
A- 22 
out due l o  weakened bond near coslo 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
Confqurolion 
AURORA-2 
GPS- 1 I ,  LOR1 II (secondary) 
EWE 
GPS-14 
GEOTAIL/DUVE 
RTCOM-C4 
KOPERNIKUS 
GPS- 12 
GPS- 13 
P U P A  6-4 
GPS- 15 
GPS- 16 
GPS- 11 
Nominal GI. GI-3, 1st Stage 430,000 Ibs of 
thrust. 2nd Stage 100,OOO Ibs of thrust 
2 liquid fuel s t a y s  using Hydrazine and 
UDMH. GI-2 
1st Slaqe-Aeroj4 X l R  87-7. 2nd Stage 
XLR 91-7, Re-Enry Module, Retroqrode 
odopter. Equipment adopter 
Staqe 1: Rocketdyne S-3D engine, 135K 
thrust. Airframe & attitude control test. Nc 
staqing. no quidance system. 
Stoqe 1: Rocketdyne S-3D engine. 135K 
thrust. Airlrome & altitude control test. Nc 
slaginq. no quidonce system. 
A- 23 
Data Encoding Database Records 
I 
Vehicle - 
JUPITER 
JUPITER 
JUPITER 
JUPITER 
JUPITER 
JUPITER 
I 
JUPITER 
JUPITER 
JUPITER 
JUNO 
JUPITCR 
JUPITER 
JUPITER 
JUNO 
Generalion -
roto-Jupder C 
roto-Jupiter C 
roto-Jupiter C 
roto-Jupiter C 
roto-Jupiter C 
ipter C 
ipter C 
ipter C 
raductian Prototyp 
I n 0  II 
ipter C 
raduction Prototyp 
raduction Prototyp 
ino II 
(Partial Viewing) 
Canfquralion 
Stoqe 1: Rocketdyne S-30 engine. 
upqraded. 139K thrust. Airframe & attitude 
control test. No staging. no quidance 
system. "Can-Type" anti-fuel sloshing 
device added. muybe better thermal 
insulation in tail. 
Stcqe 1: Rockeldyne S-30 engine. 
upgraded. 139K thrust. Airframe b attitude 
control lest. No staging. no guidance 
system. "Can-Type" anti-fuel sloshinq 
device odded. muybe better thermal 
insulation in tail. F i r t  Stage separtotion 
odded. 
139K thrust s-3D engine. both stage 
separations. heat-protected nose cane. 
partial-closed-loop ST-90 Guidance system 
139K thrust S-3D engine. bath stage 
separations. heat-protected nose cone. 
partial-closed-loop ST-90 Guidonce system 
150K thrust S-3D engine, both stage 
separations, heat-protected nose cone with 
dummy warhead and odopter kt, 
partial-closed-loop ST-90 Guidance system 
active local angle of attack control added. 
150K thrust S-30 engine. both stage 
separations. heat-protected nose cane with 
dummy warhead and adapter kd. 
partial-closed-loop ST-90 Guidance system 
active local angle of attock control added. 
interim cui-off campuier added to G&C 
Same as last except H202 vernier engine 
lull-scale nose cone w l h  lqhlweighl dummy 
warhead. 
Same as lost except smoll sold motor 
replaced H202 - powered vernier enqine. 
Same as last except first test of "ico" 
production prototype Jupiter. 
Jupder-based Juna. Late model Juptier with 
guidance per p.9. tank lenqthened 3 6 , Z n d  
cluster of I1 descoled serqenl solds. 3rd 
slcqe=l descaled serqent poineer 111 m n  
probe paylood. 
Same os 9 except small solid motor 
replaced H202 - powered vernier engine. 
See p.10 2nd production missle 
See p.10 3rd production missk 
See p12 Poineer 4 moon probe paylood, 
passed moon at 35000 mi and entered sola' 
orbd. 
Data 
Page 
JJ3 
- 
- 
JJ4 
JJ5 
.u6 
- 
dl 
.ua 
JJ9 
JJlO 
J J I  1 
- 
JJ12 
JJ13 
JJ14 
JJ15 
- 
JJ16 
- 
launch 
Date - 
rn 
10/22/57 
11/26/57 
12/18/57 
j/18/58' 
1/17/58 
1/27/58 
0/8/58 
1216/58 
12/13/58 
VmT 
!/27/59 
1/3/59 
Remarks 
uel sloshing seems to hove been eliminated. 
ome thing reoccured on next flight. 
imilar to previous Jupiter Mission. 
o info on cause or fix of "collision". 
ernier engine cutoff problems reoccurred 
iter (see pp14-15) bui involved lote rather 
Ian ear) cutoff. 
ossibb a recurrence of the thermal 
isulation failure. See p l .  
?is or similar failure recurred on next 
qht-see p.15 
eems to be recurrence of failure in previous 
iqht. Nose cone moy have broken up 
uring reentry. 
A- 24 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Vehicle 
JPlTER 
JPIIER 
JPITER 
IPIIER 
IPIIER 
IN0 
JNO 
JPlTER 
IPIIER 
IPllER 
IN0 
JPITER 
IPIIER 
IPIIER 
IPlTER 
JPITER 
IPIIER 
. 
(Partial Viewing) 
In0 II See p12. Payload was Explorer VI1  
with 1600nm range. Long range warhecd. 
eliminate control problems an short flights 
(see p25) installed. 
loss on shod missions. 
- 
launch 
Dole 
13/59 
1/6/59 
- 
1/14/59 
77VT 
7mr 
/16159 
/14/59 
/26/59 
/16/59 
/30/59 
0/13/59 
0/21/59 
1/4/59 
1/18/59 
m 
2/16/59 
/25/60 
Remarks 
MuHiple failures. See continuation page 18A. 
Unclear whether foilures are linked, tail 
section fire may be a reccurrence of earller 
problem. See p p l d r l l .  
See conlinuolion page 240. Mulliple failures. 
4pporenlly a fundometnal design flow 
xordynomics plus limited control range of 
guidance system. 
zonsideroble domoge to  pad and adjacent 
jlructures. including launch vehicle on 
3djoinning pad 260 (probobiy Jupiter 31 
launched 10/21/59- see p. 30) 
Srbit (Circular?) was about 6 mi. higher than 
planned 
hrsl full production Jupiter C(?) probably 
same vehicle thal got tank punctures from 
exploding Jupiter on adjacent pad 260 - see 
p.26 
Fix for control problem identified 
eorlier(p.25). However, note thal this 1200mi 
ilighl did not lest the new program Ot shod 
range and high p lch rates. 
May be a reccurence of lail section 
overheatinq. See p p l . l l .  
Apparenliy a successful fix for the control 
problem experienced during earlier 300nm 
llight(seep.25). 
Not clear 1 hot instrument compartment a h  
caused quidance error. 
A- 25 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
Vehicle 
IUPlTER 
IUNO 
IUPITER 
IUNO 
UPlTER 
UNO 
UNO 
CPITER 
UPITER 
UPlTER 
UPITER 
UPllER 
,TARDBIRD 
UD COUNTERMWURE U 
UD COUNTERMEASURE M 
IRILLANT PEBBLES LAUN 
'ROSPECTOR 
satellie. 
3perotional Juplier C Slandord operational missk. Tesl objective: 
show tactical GSE compatibility for 15- min 
tactical countdown. Minimum Telemetry. 
Satellde (901bs) 
lperalional Juptkr C Standard operational Jupiter I/ dummy 
tactical warhead. Tesl objective: 15 min 
countdown w/ operational crew 
U 
luna II I Per 012. Pwload: 76.5 Ib scientific stoellite. 
Explorer XI I 
lousl Single stage Castor N-A sold prapellanl 
rickel motor with a redesiqned aft-skirt / 
control system. C-Band beacon. and LR-81  INS was used for guidance. 
Doto 
Page 
JJ36 
- 
d 3 7  
- 
d 3 8  
- 
JJ39 
- 
d 4 0  
- 
d4 1 
- 
d 4 2  
- 
4 4 3  
JJ44 
d 4 5  
- 
LJ46 
- 
447 
.ME 
- 
OTRl 
- 
OTR2 
OTR3 
OTR4 
OTR7 
- 
Launch 
Date 
2/4/60 
3/23/60 
imim 
11/3/60 
2J24/61 
r/22/61 
(/27/61 
j/24161 
5/4/61 
12/6/61 
6/18/62 
1/22/63 
T2J17/90 
2/11/93 
imn- 
10/16/92 
6/18/91 
Remarks 
First operational missle test. 
Minor guidance error in stage1 (1 de9) 
opparenlty carrecled. 
3rbd 304 x 113 mi vs. planned 295 x 1138. 
[his is the onb clearly identified 
human-error failure in the Jupiter / Juna 
series. 
Deslruct command transmlted when anlennc 
reached 5 degree elevation 
Command deslrucl was sent at T t 2 5  
seconds. 
A- 26 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
Confquration 
'odernized Pershinq 1A; 2 stages; terminult) 
u i d  warhead 
ershinq II: 2 stages; terminally guided r/v. 
ershinq II: 2 stoqes; terminally guided r/v. 
ershinq I1 2 stoges; lerminolly quided r/v. 
ershinq II: 2 stages; terminally guided r/v. 
ershinq II: 2 staqes; terminally guided r/v. 
ershing II: 2 stages; terminally guided r/v. 
ershinq II: 2 stages; terminally guided r/v. 
ershing II: 2 stages; terminally guided r/v. 
ershinq IN: 2 staqes 
ershinq II: 2 stages. 
ershing II: 2 stoqes. 
londord Pershinq 0. 
ershinq II: 2 stages; terminally guided N. 
ershinq II: 2 stages; terminally guided N. 
ershinq II: 2 sloqes; terminally guided N. 
ershinq IN: 2 stages; terminally q u i d  w. 
- 
Data 
Page 
PE 1 
- 
- 
PE4 
- 
PE6 
- 
PE8 
PE9 
- 
P E l O  
- 
PE12 
PE14 
- 
PE17 
PE 19 
PE20 
PE21 
PE24 
- 
PE27 
PE28 
PE29 
- 
P E N  
Remarks 
lest number 4235. Destruct signal sent at 
17 seconds by RSO. Debris impocled along 
he fliqht path on the beach and in the 
xean. 
!est number 6693. Enqineer~nq Development 
'Iqht. 
lest number 1675. Engineering Development 
.light. 
fest number 21 39. Engineering Development 
dodel. 
lest number 4147. Engineering Development 
l iqht. 
!est number 3685 Engineering Development 
liqtht. 
inqineerinq Development flight. 
lest number 1825. Precautionary destruct 
iction sent at 1 t 90 seconds. Engineering 
kvelopment Flight. Steel ring later found 
lot to have been instolled property. 
lest number 5947. Engineering Development 
-light. 
!est number 4 1  63. Engineering Development 
.light. "Cold shot" bunch. 
!est number 5361. Enqineerinq Development 
light. 
lest number 4202. "Hot Shot" flight. 
lest number 5437. The test wos originally 
jcheduled for 9/27/84 but developed 
mboord cornpuler trouble. S' nificantly bod 
weother (tropical storm Isidor! on 9/27/84. 
'Hot Shot" Launch. 
lest number 2649. "Operotional Elliciency" 
Launch. 
lest number 4530. "Operotional Efficiency" 
launch. 
lest number 6502. "Operotional Elliciency" 
launch. 
lest number 2573. "Operationol Efficiency" 
launch. 
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Data Encoding Database Records 
Vehicle 
'ERSHING II 
'ERSHING I1 
'ERSHING II 
'ERSHIK I1 
'ERSHIK II 
'fRSHlK II 
ERSHING I1 
ERSHING II 
ERSHING II 
ERSHING II 
ERSWNG II 
ERSHING II 
ERSHING II 
ERSHING II 
ERSHING II 
ERSHING II 
ERSHING I1 
ERSHING II 
Generolion 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II A-0 
II FOT 
(Partial Viewing) 
Configuroliin 
Pershinq II: 2 stages; terminally quided N. 
Pershinq II: 2 stages; terminally guided N. 
Pershing Il: 2 stages; terminally guided N. 
Pershinq 11: 2 stages: terminally quided N. 
Pershinq 11: 2 stages; terminally guided N. 
Pershinq II: 2 slages; terminally quided N. 
Pershirq 1 1  2 stages; terminally quided N. 
Pershinq 11: 2 stages; terminally q u i d  N. 
Pershing 11: 2 stages; terminally guided N. 
Pershinq II: 2 stages; terminally quided N. 
'ershinq I l  2 stages; terminally quided N. 
Standard Pershinq It: 2 staqes; terminally 
iuided N. 
Standard Pershing II: 2 stages; terminally 
guided N. 
Standard Pershirq (I: 2 stages; terminally 
guided N. 
Standard Pershing I): 2 stages; terminally 
guided N. 
Standard Pershinq II: 2 stages: terminally 
guided N. 
Standard Pershinq 11: 2 staqes; terminally 
guided N. 
Standard Pershirq Il 2 stages; terminally 
q u i d  N. 
- 
Dolo 
Poge 
PE31 
- 
- 
PE32 
- 
PE33 
- 
PE35 
- 
PE38 
- 
PE39 
- 
PE40 
- 
PE41 
- 
PE42 
- 
PE43 
- 
PE45 
- 
PE46 
- 
PE47 
- 
PE48 
- 
PE50 
- 
PE52 
- 
PE57 
- 
PE58 
- 
Launch 
Dale - 
j/24/86 
i/26/86 
j/26/86 
5/24/87 
1/24/87 
5/24/87 
1/24/87 
5/24/87 
rn 
w 
w 
,/20/87 
,/20/87 
i/20/87 
i/27/87 
i/ryss 
!/15/ss 
A- 28 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 1 
COORDINATE ERRORS 
COORDINATE ERRORS 
A- 29 
Vehicle - . 
'OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
QLARIS 
OLARG 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OMRE 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
Ow16 
OLARG 
OLARG 
OLARlS 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
Generolion - 
A1 ORRT 
A1 ORRT 
A1 ORRT 
A1 ORRT 
A 1  ORRT 
A 1  ORRT 
A 1  ORRT 
A 1  ORRT 
41 ORRT 
41 ORRT 
41 ORRT 
41 ORRT 
41 ORRT 
A1 ORRT 
A 1  ORRT 
All-8 
A1T-7  
Confiqurolion 
ORRT 
ORRT 
ORRT 
3RRT 
3RRT 
3RRT 
3RRI 
IRRT 
IRRT 
IRRT 
IRRT 
IRRT 
3RRT 
3RRT 
3RRI 
IEST ARTICLE, PX PROGRAM PHASE II - 
SAME AS A1T-7 
TEST ARTICLE. PX PROGRAM PWE II - 
SAME AS A l l - 8  
Data 
Page 
PO19 
- 
- 
PO20 
- 
PO2 I 
- 
PO22 
PO23 
- 
PO24 
- 
PO25 
- 
PO26 
PO27 
- 
PO28 
- 
PO29 
- 
PO30 
- 
PO31 
- 
PO32 
- 
PO34 
- 
PO35 
- 
PO36 
A- 30 
Data Encoding: Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
~~ 
Confquration 
\CTKAL A1 VEHKLE WITH EXERCISE 
ARHEAD 
A- 31 
Remarks - 
HE FIRST STAGE FOLLOWED PLANNED 
RAJECTORY AS DID THE SECOND UNTIL 100, 
iEC SECOND SEPARATION DID NOT OCCUR 
\NO NO PRIMARY TEST OBJECTNES WERE 
rCHlEVED 
HE MISSLE STABILIZED ON TRMECTORY 
YlTHlN 1 3 SECONDS AFTER IGNITION AND 
:ORRECTfDTHE INTlAL ROLL DISPLACEMENT 
If 31.5 DEG CLOCKWISE THRUST 
iEPARATlON SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED PROPERLl 
ERMlNATlON AND RE-ENTRY BODY 
JECTlON fROM SUBMARINE. BROdCH AhD 
'ST STAGE #;NITION OCCURRED hORMA.LY. A 
LIGHT COMROL MALF JFlCTlOh EARLY IN IS1 
iTAGE FlIGdl NECESSITATED DESTRUCTION @ 
iasEc 
JECTION FROM LAUNCH TUBE. BROACH AND 
iTABlLlZED IN PLANNED TRAJECTORY. 1ST 
iTAGE POWERED fLGHl AND GUIDANCE WERE 
4ORMAL UNTIL 40 SEC WHEN MISSLE FLIGHT 
ECAME ERRATIC. DESTRUCT 8 79.1 
IS1 STAGE CNlTlON NORMAL - MISSILE 
iPURlOUS JETEVATOR COMMANDS TO 
IETCVATOR NOTED BETWEEN 36  & 48 SEC 
'RODUCED(?) NONDRRGENT BODY MOTION 
'REWMINANTLY IN YAW AND ROLL. DAMPING 
RANSIENI NOT AS MUCH AS USUALLY SEEN 
AUNCH. BROACH. IGNITION AND 
N YAW DURING ROLL-OUT AND PITCH OVER 
iTABILIZATION OCCURRED NORMALLY UNTIL 
!O SEC WHEN A FLIGHT CONTROL 
lALFKNTKlN OCCURRED AND DESTRUCTED 
) I  SEC 
;OAP (SUB] AT APPROX. 103 SEC JETEVATDF 
11  & 13 POSITIONS INDICATED A CORRECT101 
'OR A (?) DOWN FORCE. LAUNCH. BROAH 
GNITION. & STABILIZATION AND MISSLE 
IPERATION DURING POWERED fLlGHT WERE 
lORMAL 
LAUNCH. BROAH IGNITION. & STABILIZATION 
\ND MlSSLE OPERATON DURING POWERED 
UXl WERE NORMAL 
LAUNCH, BROAH IGNITION, & STABILIZATION 
\ND MISSLE OPERATION DURING POWERED 
.LIGHT WERE NORMAL 
4LL SYSTEM OPERATED NORMALLY 
"STAGING OCCURS Q 1 IO SEC" ANALYST 
THE FLIGHT WS SUCCESSFUL 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Generation -
A1E-33 /AlP-61 
A1E-37 / Alp-9I  
A1E-36 / Alp-11 
A1E-35 / Alp-51 
A1E-34 / A l P - I (  
AIE-43 / Alp-9  
l l E - 3 8  / Alp-1M 
I l E - 3 9  
41 E-40 
41E-41 / Alp-12  
41X-51 
41X-50 
blE-13 / Alp-19  
l l E - 9  
A l t - l D  
AlE-11 
(Partial Viewing) 
Confquration 
TEST ARTICLE 
TEST ARTCLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTICLE 
TEST ARTKLE 
lEST ARTICtE 
rEsT ARTICLE 
rEsT ARTICLE. 'THRUST TERMINATION 
INTENTlALlY WIRED OUT" 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTKLE (GUIDED). SUPER SDAP 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED). SUPER SDAP 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED). SUPER SDAP 
- 
Data 
Page 
PO56 
- 
PO57 
- 
PO59 
- 
PO61 
- 
PO63 
- 
PO65 
- 
PO67 
- 
PO69 
- 
PO70 
- 
PO7 1 
- 
PO72 
- 
PO74 
- 
PO76 
- 
p07a 
- 
PO79 
- 
PO79 
- 
PO79 
WAS SUCCESSfUL WlTH ALL MAJOR SYSTEMS 
PERFORMING SASTISFACTORY. TESTING 2NO 
STAGE FLUID IMECTION TVC 2ND STAGE BASE 
THERMAL ENVlRONMENT 
DURING POWERED FLKtil 
SYSTEM TO STRIKE A PRESCRIBED TARGET. 
"NOT COUNTED As LV FAILURE" 
SUCCSSFUL" 
4 TESTS 8 SEA 15 -18 NOV 60  " ALL TESTS 
SUCCSSFUL" 
4 TESTS 0 SEA 15 -18  NOV 60 " ALL TESTS 
SUCCSSFUL" 
A- 32 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
FROM SUB SUCSEEFUL K;NITION. POWERED 
TUGHl & GUIDACNCE lNTl4TED THRUST 
TERMINATION WERE NORMAL 
EMERGED @ 24.6 SEC AND FOLlOWED AN 
SUBMARINE SUPPORT EQUIPMEM 
EJECTON. POWERED FlKHT, & GUIDANCE 
PITCHOSCILLATON DURING fLIGHT. 
PRESSURE INCREASED TO A POINT WHICH 
EXCEEDED DESIGN CONDITIONS AND THE 
MOTOR BOTTLE RUPTURED. 
A- 33 
Vehicle 
'OLARIS 
10LARIS 
'OLARIS 
'01 ARlS 
'DLARIS 
OLARlS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OlARlS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARh 
OLARIS 
OLARh 
OLARIS 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
Generalion 
A1X-44 
A1 X-37 
A1X-47 
A1X-43 
A1X-41 
A1X-39 
A1X-40 
A1X-34 
RlX-27 
RlX-17 
hlX-30 
A1X-25 
A1X-23 
A1X-22 
- 
TEST ARTICLE UNGUIDED INERT AEC 
DNELOPMENI WARHEAD 
TEST ARTlCLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTCLE (FULLY GUIDED) 
TEST ARTCLE UNGUIDED. INERT AEC 
WARHEAD 
TEST ARTICLE UNGUIDED. INERT AEC 
WARHEAD 
TEST ARTCLE FULLY GUIDED 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTCLE (UNGUIDED) AED WARHEAD 
TEST ARTICLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTCLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTCLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTCLE (GUIDED) 
TEST ARTICLE (UNGUIDED) AEC WARHEAD 
TEST ARTCLE (UNGUIDED) AEC WARHEAD 
AVTOPILDT 
TEST ARTICLE (UNGUIDED) AEC WARHEAD 
AUTOPILOT 
A- 34 
6-1- 
Data Encoding: Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
Configuration 
[EST ARTICLE (GUIDED) 
KST ARTlCLE (GUIDED) 1ST POLARIS IN 
WIND TURK 
IEST ARTKLE (GUIDED) 
[EST ARTICLE (UNGUIDED), AUTOPILOT 
IONTROL-NEWLY MODIFIED HYDRAULIC 
jYSTEM AND AFT END HEAT SHIELD 
[EST ARTICLE (UNGUIDED). FIRST TACTICAL 
:ONFIGURATION -AUTOPILOT STEERING ONLY 
[EST ARTICLE (GUIDED. FULLY INERTVU 
XIDANCE SYSTEM) 
[EST ARTICLE (GUIDED] 
[EST ARTICLE (UNGUIDED). AUTOPILOT 
$TEERING 
[EST ARTICLE (GUIDED, FULLY INERTlAL 
XIIDANCE SYSTEM) 
[EST ARTICLE (GUIDED] 
[EST ARTKLE (GUIDED) 
IEST ARTlCLE (GUIDED) 1ST FULLY GUIDED 
MlSSLE 
IEST ARTKLE (PARTVULY GUIDED) 
IEST ARTICLE (UNGUIDED) 
IEST ARTICLE (UNGUIDED) 
TEST ARTKLE (UNGUIDED) 
Rso 
Evol. 
P 
- 
- 
P 
- 
F 
- 
S 
- 
F 
- 
P 
- 
S 
- 
P 
- 
S 
- 
S 
Remarks 
Sn PS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM SUCCtSSF J.LY 
INSERTED Ah AI  SEA PlATfORM OR~fMATtOh. 
AhD LOCATlOh INTO MISIltE GJlDAhCf 
SYSTEM AIR EJECTION. IGhlTlON ALD 
POJlERED FlGdl OF MISSLE APPARCNTtY 
NORMAL IO 1 I2 SEC 
EARL! TERMiMI ON - ALL PORTS DID NOT 
SEPARATON 
BLOW - MALfLkCllON A I  TIME OF REV 
TEST NUMEROUS FUNCTIONS HYDRAULIC 
SYSTEM CONTROL. REV DYNAMICS & THERMAL 
DYNAMICS, THERMAL DESIGN. 2ND STAGE 
MOTOR FRONT EN0 
MISSILE SUCCESSfULLY ACCOMPLISHED 78.6 
ROLL AND DESIRED FLIGHT CONTROL (NOT 
DESTRYOYED @ 104 SEC. MALFUNCTION OF 
CONTROL SYSTEM CAUSED JETEVATOR TO GO 
HEAD OVER. 
MlSSlE PERFROMACE & REV DYNAMICS & 
THERMO DYNAMICS. AFTER LAUNCH MISSLE 
ROLLED 89 DEG TO DESIRED UIMUTH. 
GUIDANCE FUNCTONAL NORMALLY 
TEST MISSLE PERFROMANCE. RE-ENTRY BOD) 
FLKHT DYNAMICS. AND THERMO DYNAMICS. 
LAUNCH AND POWERED FLIGHT NORMAL 
GUIDANCE) MALFUNCTION OCCURRED - 
IEST PERFROMANCE AND CONTROL - REV 
DYNAMICS AND THERM0 DYNAMICS, GUIDANCE 
EVAL. ABILITY OF FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM 
30  ROLL MANUEVER SUCCESSFUL. GUIDED 
FLKHl NORMAL 
ONLY DOCUMENTATKIN IS "SUCCESSFUL" 
NO ANOMALIES. DEVELOPMENT TEST OF - 
BASIC MISSON. RE-ENTRY BODY. GUIDANCE 
SYSTEM. FIRE CONTROL 
LOSS OF CONTROL DURING 1ST STAGE 
SEPARATION - MlSSLE NORMAL TILL 6 SEC 
AFTER STAGING 
NIGHT LAUNCH 
13.5 NM TARGET ERROR. ABNORMAL 2ND 
STAGE SEPARATON 
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Data Encoding: Database Records 
Vehicle 
'OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OlARlS 
OLARlS 
OlARlS 
OLARIS 
Generolion 
1x-2 
1 x - l  
K-20 
(-14 
(-22 
(-18 
(-13 
1-15 
(-11 
(-9 
(-10 
(-7 
(-8 
(-6 
(-5 
1-4 
1-3 
(Partial Viewing) 
Confquroliin 
Dot0 
Page 
TEST ARTKLE 
TEST ARTCLE 
TEST ARTKLE - FIRST SHIP LAUNCH 
TEST ARTCLE 
TEST ARTICLE 
TEST ARTlCLE 
TEST ARTICLE 
TEST ARTICLE 
TEST ARTKLE 
TEST ARTICLE 
TEST ARTlCLE 
TEST ARTCLE 
TEST ARTKLE 
TEST ARTICLE 
TEST ARTICLE 
PO139 
PO140 
PO141 
PO142 
PO143 
PO144 
PO146 
PO148 
PO1 49 
PO1 50  
PO151 
PO153 
PO154 
PO155 
PO158 
16 
RMINATHIN. EXCEPT"SUCCESSFU1". 
CT 75NM RK;HT& 3.5 NM LONG 
F 
- 
S 
2ND STAGE DESTROYED BY RSO. 1S1 STAGE 
hOT DESTROYED BECAUSE IhSTRCMENTATON 
GONE 
IMPACT COORDINATES CORRESPOND TO 
AIMING POINT COORDINATES 
MISSILE HAD GUIDANCE PACKAGE EUT WAS 
NOT USED JUST MONITORED '
(SOURCE UNKNOWN) "SUCCESSFUL". 
NOMINAL IMPACT" 
IMPACT 58NM DOWNRANGE. INM LEFT 7 
45NM SHORT. 15NM LEFT - IN PROPOSED 
AREA (SOURCE UNKNOWN) SUCCESSFUL" 
BASED ON rso NOTES" PROVIDED SUFFICIENT 
DATA TO MEET 90% OF PRIMARY OEJECTNES 
HAPPENED? 
& 75% OF SECONDARY OB. - WHAT 
TEST FOR BASIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT RSO 
ESTIMATED THAT BOX OF PRIMARY TEST 
OBJECTNE WAS ATTAINED 
TESTS FOR BASIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT. 
MISSILE PERFORMANCE AND RESPONSE TO 
CONTROL ACTON AN0 EVALUATHIN Of 
SEPARATION 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Vehicle 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARIS 
OLARlS 
OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
Generation 
4x-2 
4x-1 
1-204-14 / FN 1 
1-204-13 / FTV 1 
1-204-12 / FN 1 
1-204-11 i FN 1 
1-204-10 / FTV 1 
1-204-9 / fTV 1- 
1-204-8 / FTV 1- 
3-204-4 
3-204-3 
(Partial Viewing) 
Configuration 
EST ARTICLE 
EST ARTICLE 
EST ARTICLE 
EST ARTICLE 
EST ARTICLE 
EST ARTICLE 
EST ARTCLE 
EST ARTKLE 
EST ARTICLE 
'EST ARTCLE 
'EST ARTICLE 
Doto 
Page 
PO159 
- 
- 
PO161 
- 
Po162 
- 
PO163 
- 
PO164 
- 
PO1 65  
- 
PO166 
- 
PO167 
- 
PO1 69 
- 
PO171 
- 
PO173 
STAGE REMAINED ON THE PAD. - 
F 
- 
S 
-v 
PERFROMANCE. AlRFRAMf. INTEGRIN AND 
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM PERFROMANCE. RS( 
TOOK DESTRUCT ACTION AT 2 5  SEC. NO TEST 
OBJECTNES ACHIEVED 
TO fVAlUATE ABILITY Of VEHICLE TO 
RESPOND TO A 76  DEG LAUNCH ATTITUDE TO 
14 DEG PITCH UP STEP COMMAND FOLLOWED 
BY A 14 DEG PITCH OVER COMMAND. 
PORGRAM WAS APPLIED AS PLANNED AND 
VEHILCE RESPONSE , IMPACT 66 DEG 
39000FT 
FOLLOW A PROGRAMMED PITCH OVER TRN.. 
THE PITCH OVER PROGRAM WAS APPLIED AS 
PLANNED AND THE VEHICLE RESPONSE WAS 
SATISFACTORY. IMPACT 105 OEG. l8OOOfT IN 
PROPOSED AREA 
TEST TO EVALUATE ABILITY OF VEHICLE TO 
FOLLOW A PROGRAMMED PITCH OVER TRAJ, 
THE PITCH OVER PROGRAM WAS APPLIED AS 
PLANNED AND THE VEHICLE RESPONSE WAS 
SATISFACTORY. IMPACT 100 DEG. 33000FT IN 
PROPOSED AREA 
F 
F TEST - NALUATE ABILITY TO fOlLOW A 
PRELIM. ANALYSIS - 
CONSTANT ATTlTUDE TRN. RADAR PLOTS AND 
INTENDED TRAI."TEST OBJECTNES APPEAR TO 
HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED" MISSILE EXPLODED @ 
31000FT IN PROPOSE 
STABLE FLGHI ON THE 
THURST REVERSAL- IMPACT 88 DEG. 
CONTROL SYS. INCORPORATING ANGLE OF 
ATTACK LIMITING SYS. AND EVA1 OF AlRFRAMl 
RESPONSE TO CONTROL ACTUATOR. IMPACT 
110 DEG 45000FT IN PROPOSED AREA 
CONTROL SYS. INCORPORATING ANGLE OF 
ATTACK LIUITING SYS. AND B A L  OF AlRFRAUl 
RESPONSE TO CONTROL ACTUATOR IMPACT 
97  DEG 31000fT IN PROPOSE0 AREA 
CONTROL SYS. INCORPORATING ANGLE OF 
ATTACK LlMlTlNG SYS. AND EVA1 OF AlRFRAMl 
RESPONSE TO CONTROL ACTUATION."IEST 
INIOICATE A FlALURE BUT SPECIFICS ARE NOT 
NOTED 
ON. WERE APPARENTLY MET" - THIS MAY 
RE-ENTRY BODY TESTS, IMPACT 106 DEG. 
132NM IN PROPOSED AREA H
RE-ENTRY BODY TESTS, IMPACT 8 5  DEG. 
1 l6NM IN PROPOSED AREA. TELEMETRY ATRACKING PROBLEMS 
A- 37 
Data Encoding Database Records 
I 
(Partial Viewing) 
Vehicle 
1 
'OLARIS 
'OLARK 
'01 ARIS 
'OLARIS 
'OLARIS 
'01 ARIS 
'01 ARIS 
?ED TlGRESS 
RED TlGRESS 
RED TCRESS 
RED TlGRESS 
SATURN 
SATURN 
SATURN 
1 
Generalion 
3-204-7 
3-204-6 
5-204-1 
5-204-2 
3-204-1 
4- 204 -2  
4-204-1 
PAHSE VI- 1 
I 
II 
II(A) 
ll(B) 
SATURN 1 BOOSTER 
SATURN 1 BOOSTER 
SATURN 1 BOOSTER 
Confquralion 
a 
[EST ARTICLE 
lEST ARTKLE 
[EST ARTICLE 
[EST ARTICLE 
[EST ARTKLE 
rEsT ARTM 
rEsT ARTICLE 
TEST ARTICLE 
1st stage - TALOS, 2nd stage - Serqant. 
3rd stage - M57A1 
1st sloqe - TALOS. 2nd stage - Sergonl, 
3rd sloge - M57A1 
S-1 BOOSTER W/ 8 X H-1 ENGINES 
(LOX-RP-1 165KLB THRUST) PLUS DUMMY 
S-4 2ND STAGE. DUMMY S-5 3RD STAGE 
DUMMY PAYLOAD BODY. INTERTNL GUlDANCl 
SYS. W E D  ON ST-90 STAB. PLATFORM 
USED IN JUPITER. LIFTOFF WECHT 926KLB 
SEE P.l. UPPER STAGES INTENTION4LlY 
RUPTURED BY fTS COUMAND AT 105 KM 
ALTITUDE FOR WATER CLOUD EXPERIMENT 
("PROJECT HlGH WATER"). L l t lOFF WE!GHT 
926KLB. 
SEE P.l. LIFTOFF WEIGHT 1086KLB. REPEAT 
167KM. 
PROJECT H!GH WATER -SEE P.2 - AT 
Data 
Page 
PO1 7 5  
- 
- 
PO177 
- 
PO178 
- 
PO179 
- 
PO180 
- 
PO181 
- 
PO1 82  
- 
PO183 
- 
RT5 
- 
RT8 
- 
RT9A 
- 
RT9B 
- 
SAT 1 
- 
SAT5 
- 
SAT7 
- 
S 
I )I Evol. ~ Remarks 
IMPACT CHUFFING OBSERVED FROM 1.1. TO 
[VICE AT HIGH ATTITUDE MAX 
STAGE - 555000FT IMPACT 79 
MAX AlTlTUDE 427000 I T  IMPACT 95  OEG. 
120 NM 
TEST FORWARD END THRUST REVERSAL 
TO TEST PERFROMACE OF END THRUST tRfVERSAL DEvlCE 
ACHIEVE THRUST REVEML AND TO 
DETERMINE MAJOR FORCES APPLIED TO THE 
VEHlClE DURING THRUST RMRSAL 
I 
A 
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Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) - 
Launch 
Dole 
- 
1/29/64 
j/28/64 
)/18/64 
!/16/65 
!72s/ss 
tJ5/66 
1/25/66 
11/'9/67 
i j j  
q q r  
10/11/68 
12/21/68 
1/4/69 
A- 39 
Data Encoding Database Records 
Vehicle - 
ATURN 
A T U W  
A T W N  
PACE SHUTTLE 
PACE SHUTTLE 
PACE SHUTTLE 
PACE SHUTTLE 
PACE SHUTTLE 
PAcf SHUTTLE 
PACE SHUllLE 
PCE SHUTILE 
SHUTTLE 
PACE SHUTTLE 
PACE SHUTTLE 
PACE SHUllLE 
(Partial Viewing) 
s / 3 rnoin engines; ET-liquid 
llonl edernal tonk; 2 solid rocket 
olurnbio Integrated Shuttle Vehicle: Orbler-2 OMS 
engines / 3 main engines; ET-tiqud 
propelbnt edernal tonk; 2 solid rocket 
I boosters 
olurnbm Integrated Shuttle Vehicle: Orbiter-2 OMS 
engines / 3 main engines; ET-liquid 
proDellont edernal tank; 2 solid rocket 
3 main engines; ET-Liquid 
external tonk; 2 solid rocket 
Integrated Shuttle Vehicle: Orbiter-2 OMS 
engines / 3 main engines; ET-liquid 
propellant external tank 2 solid rocket 
1 boosters 
propellonl edernal tank; 2 solid rocket 
boosters 
- 
Launch 
Dole - 
7/16/69 
4/11/70 
4/12/81 
m 
3/22/82 
5/27/82 
5/18/83 
3/30/83 
m 
rn 
6/30/84 
10/5/84 
11/8/84 
Remarks 
A- 40 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
prdpellanl edernal taik; 2 sold rocket 
I 1 boosters 
U 
DACE SHUTTLE Discovery Integrated Shuttle Vehicle: Orbiter-2 OMS 
engines / 3 main engines; El-Liquid 
propellont edernal tank; 2 sold rocket 
?ACE SHUllLE Chollenqer Integrated Shuttle Vehicle: Orbiter-2 OMS 
engines / 3 main engines; El-Liquid 
Drop?llanl edernal lank; 2 solid rocket 
1 boosters 1 
PACE SHUTTLE Discovery Integrated Shuttle Vehicle: Orbiter-2 OMS 
engines / 3 main engines; ET-Liquid n Dropellant external tank; 2 sold rocket 
U 
PACE SHUTTLE Discovery Integrated Shuttle Vehicle: Orbiter-2 OMS 
engines / 3 main enqines; ET-Liquid 
Drowllanl edernol tank; 2 sold rocket 
3 main enqines: El-Liquid 
edernol tank; 2 sold rocket 
ers, SRBs are equipped w lh  beacons. 
A- 41 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
At lantis Integrated Shuttle Vehicle: Orbiter-2 OMS 
engines / 3 moin enqines; ET-Liquid 
Drowllant external tank 2 sold rocket 
es / 3 main engines: ET-Lquid 
propellont edernol tonk: 2 solid rocket 
boosters. SRB's ore equipped wah beocans. 
propellonl edernol tank 2 solid rccket 
boosters. SRBs ore equipped with beacons. 
4tlantis lnteqroted Shuttle Vehicle: Orbiter-2 OMS 
engines / 3 main enqines; ET-liquid 
A propellant external tank; 2 solid rocket 
boosters. SRBs ore equiDwd with beacons. 
Tumble Value Inhibled. 
Tumble Volw Inhibited. 
Mlontis Integrated Shuttle Vehicle: Orbiter-2 OMS 
engines / 3 main engines; CT-Liquid 
propellant ederrml tank 2 sold rocket 
boosters. SRB's ore equiDwd with beocons. 
Tumble Value Inhibled. I 
Endevour 
Discovery 
A- 
- 
Data 
Page 
STS28 
- 
- 
STS29 
- 
STS30 
- 
STS31 
STS32 
- 
STS33 
- 
STS34 
STS35 
STS36 
STS37 
STS38 
STS39 
- 
SIS40 
- 
STS4I 
Remarks 
' SRBs have 2.65 million Ibs of thrust, 1 ET 
ontoins 1.58 million Ibs of CO2 and lH2. 3 
nain enqines with 375,000 Ibs of thrust 
, flight recorder was activated without the 
ippropriote siqnol from controllers. This 
aused a 30 min. launch delay. 
he "8" charts were used. 
st launch using DOll lU by NASA, C wind 
harts used 
I charts used. This was the first time the 
idjust trajectory (DOLILU) was used an the 
lisplay. 
, charls used, TRSS wos used for the first 
ime on any launch and 59 sec of data. 
, charts used, large deviation between 
heoretical ond post - MECO ET impact 
loinls due mainty to launch occurring late in 
rindow and parlty to 5 Ips underspeed. 
, chorts used.The range between the actual 
ind theoretical ET impact points is 1. lnm 
1 charts used. 
i charts used. 
charts used. 
Data Encoding: Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 1 
Vehicle Configuration I Generation 
ers. SRBs are equipped with beocow. 
-. 
SPACE SHUTTLE 
- 
Data 
Page - 
STS42 
- 
STS43 
- 
STS44 
- 
STS45 
- 
v9 
- 
v10 
- 
v11 
- 
v12 
- 
V13 
- 
V14 
- 
V15 
- 
V I  6 
- 
V17 
- 
VI8 
1 )I Eval. Remarks 
B charts used. Radar 19.17 became NMC in 
the minus count and was not used. Dolilu 
transmission lines were not working. hence 
the Do l l lU  adjust trajectoy was not 
presented on the RSD's. (Assume ground I tracking - not STS) 
S B charts used. Data was corrupted at about 
40 sec causing track to stroy significantly to  
the left for a short time. (Assumed STS 
instruments) I 
payload and third stage motor case. This 
orbd is significantly less than the 1000 year 
orbit first attained with launch vehicle lV-4 
previous launch. Obviously the second stage 
problem had not been identified and 
corrected. 
The bock of the missle performance sheet is 
missing. From the first page it is not clear 
that a specific problem has not been 
ldentifkd and corrected 
Second stage pedormance was low, due l o  o 
law propane fuel flaw rate. 
F 
P 
was either misdiagnosed or not properly 
corrected. The back of the missle 
performonce record is missing. 
bunching vehicle. Back of miss!+ 
performonce record sheet missing. 11 1.5 
sec removed from 2nd staqe cutoff of 261.5 
A- 43 
Data Encoding Database Records 
(Partial Viewing) 
Generation I Configuration 
1st Stage - GE X-405 propulsion using 
kerosene and LOX, 2nd Stage - Areojel 
General AJIO-37 propulsion using WINFNA 
and UDMH. 3rd stoqe - Grand Central 
33-KS-2800 solid propellant. lV-3 
Propellant single stage racket, W-0 
Remarks 
lark 51 was faulty and indicated a red 
ondition. 
A- 44 
APPENDIX B 
RISK AND RELIABILITY DATABASE 
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